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ABSTRACT—Suicide is increasingly recognized as a public health issue.
There are over 40,000 suicides a year in the U.S., making suicide the tenthleading cause of death in the country. But societal attitudes on the subject
remain decidedly mixed. Suicide is often closely linked to mental illness, a
condition that continues to involve stigma and often triggers irrational fears
and misunderstanding. For many, suicide remains an immoral act that flies
in the face of strongly held religious principles. In some ways, tort law’s
treatment of suicide mirrors the conflicting societal views regarding suicide.
Tort law has long been reluctant to permit recovery in a wrongful death
action from a defendant who is alleged to have caused the suicide of the
decedent. In many instances, courts apply a strict rule of causation in suicide
cases that has actually been dubbed “the suicide rule” in one jurisdiction.
While reluctance to assign liability to defendants whose actions are alleged
to have resulted in suicide still remains the norm in negligence cases, there
has been a slight trend among court decisions away from singling out suicide
cases for special treatment and toward an analytical framework that more
closely follows traditional tort law principles. This Article argues that this
trend is to be encouraged and that it is time for courts to largely abandon the
special rules that have developed in suicide cases that treat suicide as a
superseding cause of a decedent’s death.
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INTRODUCTION
Suicide has been a controversial topic for centuries. But in recent years,
the subject has garnered increased public attention. A 2018 study released
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that
suicide rates increased in nearly every state between 1999 and 2016.1 Suicide
rates increased by over 30% in half of the states during this timeframe. 2
While the suicide rate has increased for almost every age group, 3 suicide
is the second-leading cause of death among people between the ages of 10
and 24. 4 The suicide rate for girls in particular between the ages of 10 and 14
has doubled over the past decade. 5 Media reports of school and cyber

1 Deborah M. Stone et al., Vital Signs: Trends in State Suicide Rates — United States, 1999–2016
and Circumstances Contributing to Suicide — 27 States, 2015, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 617, 617 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6722a1.htm [https://perma.cc/
NR98-CE7T].
2 Id.
3 See id. at 618 (noting that suicide rates increased for every age group under the age of 75).
4 Laura Kann et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance — United States, 2015, 65 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 2 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/ss/ss6506a1.htm [https://
perma.cc/CHT5-YSJB].
5 The group with the second highest increase in the suicide rate is men between the ages of 45 and
64 (43%). See SALLY C. CURTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STAT. DATA BRIEF: INCREASE IN SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2014, at 3 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db241.htm [https://perma.cc/QD69-NLXH].
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bullying resulting in suicide have increasingly horrified Americans. 6
According to a 2015 report from the CDC involving high school students,
“15.5% had been electronically bullied, 20.2% had been bullied on school
property, and 8.6% had attempted suicide.” 7
Suicide is increasingly recognized as a public health issue. 8 There are
over 40,000 suicides a year in the United States, making suicide the tenthleading cause of death in the country. 9 Roughly 18% of those who commit
suicide are veterans, 10 and the Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that
twenty veterans commit suicide every day. 11 The risk of suicide cuts across

6 See Samantha Schmidt, After Months of Bullying, Her Parents Say, A 12-Year-Old New Jersey Girl
Killed Herself. They Blame the School., WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/02/after-months-of-bullying-a-12-year-old-new-jersey-girl-killedherself-her-parents-blame-the-school [https://perma.cc/9A5K-4Q5C]. The case of Michelle Carter, who
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for encouraging her friend to commit suicide through a series
of texts, shocked the public in 2017. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jess Bidgood, Guilty Verdict for Young
Woman Who Urged Friend to Kill Himself, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/suicide-texting-trial-michelle-carter-conrad-roy.html
[https://perma.cc/92ZA-GSWS].
7 Kann et al., supra note 4, at 1.
8 Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Suicide Rate Surges to a 30-Year High, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/health/us-suicide-rate-surges-to-a-30-year-high.html
[https://perma.cc/37FN-AMAT].
9 Melonie Heron, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2014, 65 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 1 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FWL-AAB5]; Gregg
Zoroya, 40,000 Suicides Annually, Yet America Simply Shrugs, USA TODAY, (published Oct. 9, 2014,
3:39 PM; updated Oct. 10, 2014, 9:45 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/09/
suicide-mental-health-prevention-research/15276353 [https://perma.cc/QYJ2-RVUF].
10 OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA Research on Suicide
Prevention, https://www.research.va.gov/topics/suicide.cfm [https://perma.cc/E2YX-BA4Y].
11 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA Suicide Prevention Program: Facts About Veteran Suicide
(July
2016),
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/
Suicide_Prevention_FactSheet_New_VA_Stats_070616_1400.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EL-JTY5].
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any number of demographic lines, including race/ethnicity, 12 socioeconomic
status, 13 and sexual orientation. 14
Just as the risk of suicide cuts across demographic lines, societal
attitudes toward suicide are remarkably heterogeneous. Several studies have
shown disparities between men and women when it comes to their views as
to the acceptability of suicide. 15 Geographic, socioeconomic, political, and
religious differences have also been shown to influence attitudes toward
suicide. 16
One reason for this divergence of views is that suicide raises
complicated and deeply personal issues. Suicide is often closely linked to
mental illness, 17 a condition that continues to attract stigma and often triggers
12 American Indians and Alaska Natives have the highest suicide rate in the United States, followed
by Caucasians. The rate among African Americans is significantly lower. AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE
PREVENTION, Suicide Statistics, https://afsp.org/about-suicide/suicide-statistics [https://perma.cc/
7AMM-PESH] (citing CDC numbers).
13 According to a World Health Organization study, “75 percent of suicides occur in low- and middleincome countries.” See Tanya Basu, The New Demographics of Suicide, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/the-new-demographics-of-suicide/379961
[https://perma.cc/33ZM-HMK9] (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING SUICIDE: A GLOBAL
IMPERATIVE
11
(2014),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/131056/
9789241564779_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3BD-NUB4]). One study of suicides in Fulton County,
Georgia, found that those who committed suicide “tended to live in lower income areas compared with
the general population of Fulton County.” David C. Purselle et al., Differential Association of
Socioeconomic Status in Ethnic and Age-Defined Suicides, 167 PSYCHIATRY RES. 258, 260 (2009).
14 See Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious
Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 223 (2008)
(summarizing studies showing greater incidence and risk of suicide among LGBT youth); Stephen T.
Russell & Kara Joyner, Adolescent Sexual Orientation and Suicide Risk: Evidence From a National
Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1276, 1278 (2001) (reporting results of survey finding “that youths with
same-sex orientation are more than 2 times more likely than their same-sex peers to attempt suicide”);
Jamiles Lartey, Risk of Poverty and Suicide Far Higher Among Transgender People, Survey Finds,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2016, 3:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/dec/08/transgendersurvey-suicide-poverty-unemployment-mental-health [https://perma.cc/HA66-276C] (reporting results
of survey finding that 40% of transgender individuals surveyed “said they had attempted suicide in their
life, almost nine times the US overall attempted suicide rate”).
15 Judith M. Stillion & Bethany D. Stillion, Attitudes Toward Suicide: Past, Present and Future,
38 OMEGA 77, 81–82 (1999).
16 Id. at 82–83. Age may also play a role. See Benedict Carey, How Suicide Quietly Morphed into a
Public Health Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/health/suicidespade-bordain-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/XDB5-ETNG] (quoting physician as saying that “[w]e are
seeing somewhat more tolerant attitudes toward suicide” among younger people).
17 One frequently cited statistic is that 90% of suicide cases involve mental illness. Zoroya, supra
note 9. This figure remains subject to dispute. See SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL
LAWS 101 (2016) (stating that this figure is “based on bad science, and the best researchers and most
famous suicidologists acknowledge it”). But the research does suggest that those with mental health issues
have higher rates of suicide than the general population. See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2012 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION: GOALS AND
OBJECTIVES FOR ACTION 101 (2012), https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/national-strategy-
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irrational fears and misunderstandings. 18 For many, suicide remains an
immoral act that flies in the face of strongly held religious principles.19
Others simply view those who die by suicide as being selfish or weak. 20 Still
others view suicide as a tragic and preventable outcome, 21 or in some
instances, a matter of rational, individual choice. 22
In some ways, tort law’s treatment of suicide mirrors the conflicting
societal views regarding suicide. Tort law has long been reluctant to permit
recovery in a wrongful death action from a defendant who is alleged to have
caused the suicide of the decedent. In many instances, courts apply a strict
rule of causation in suicide cases that has actually been dubbed “the suicide
rule” in one jurisdiction. 23 Courts have rested their conclusions on a variety
of grounds, but many of the decisions reveal a fundamental unease with the
idea of assigning responsibility to defendants in such cases. 24 This is true
even where the defendant is alleged to have engaged in intentional
suicide-prevention/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/65X4-6GCT] (listing those with mental health
conditions as being at greater risk of suicide); Jennifer M. Boggs et al., General Medical, Mental Health,
and Demographic Risk Factors Associated with Suicide by Firearm Compared with Other Means,
69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 677, 679 (2018) (reporting results of study finding that 61% of suicide deaths
involved at least one mental disorder, “with the highest prevalence for alcohol use, anxiety, depression,
and sleep disorders,” and that over half of suicides studied involved individuals who had a psychiatric
disorder diagnosed in the year prior to suicide death).
18 See Susan D. Carle, Analyzing Social Impairments Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1109, 1172 (2017) (noting that “persons with social impairments [including
mental illness] face the problem of stigma”); John V. Jacobi, Mental Illness: Access and Freedom,
16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2016) (noting the historical stigmatization of people with mental
disorders and the accompanying consequences); Debbie N. Kaminer, Mentally Ill Employees in the
Workplace: Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 205,
217 (2016) (discussing the perception among some that mental illness is a character defect); Wayne
Edward Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REV.
951, 951 (1992) (“Anglo-American society historically has viewed the mentally ill as outsiders.”);
Elizabeth A. McGuan, Note, New Standards for the Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
“Danger” Redefined, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 181, 184 (2009) (“To be labeled ‘mentally ill’ means
to be included in a group that has been viewed with aversion and fear throughout history.”).
19 See Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 80 (“Some voices still speak of suicide as sin . . . .”).
20 See Stephanie Chandler, Please Don’t Give Up, WASH. POST (June 8, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/please-dont-give-up/2018/06/08/b3cb84aa-6b42-11e8-bf8c-f9ed2e672
adf_story.html [https://perma.cc/6YYL-5JG8] (noting the view among some that suicide is a selfish act).
21 Karl Rove, My Mom’s Suicide Was Preventable, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2018, 6:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-moms-suicide-was-preventable-1528929056 [https://perma.cc/V4UBNNJX].
22 See Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 80 (“[O]thers view it as a rational, individual choice,
perhaps even a right.”); Paula Span, A Debate Over ‘Rational Suicide,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018),
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/health/suicide-elderly.html [https://perma.cc/P8XN-V8U2] (discussing
the notion of “rational suicide” in the context of suicide among older adults).
23 See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
24 See generally STEFAN, supra note 17, at 12–13 (“The law has always assumed that people are
legally responsible for their suicides and suicide attempts . . . .”).
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wrongdoing as opposed to mere negligence and in some cases where the
defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress. 25 As this Article
explains, this majority approach to wrongful death cases involving suicide
reflects a straight line from nineteenth-century American judicial decisions,
which themselves have as their origin English law from the Middle Ages. 26
These older decisions are based on the then-prevailing views regarding
morality and mental illness. While reluctance to assign liability to defendants
whose actions are alleged to have resulted in suicide still remains the norm
in negligence cases, there has been a slight trend among court decisions away
from singling out suicide cases for special treatment and toward an analytical
framework that more closely follows traditional tort law principles.27
This Article argues that this trend is to be encouraged and that it is time
for courts to largely abandon the special rules that have developed in suicide
cases that mechanically treat suicide as a superseding cause of a decedent’s
death. Part I describes the historical views regarding suicide in Europe dating
back to the Middle Ages that helped to shape American attitudes and law.
Part II discusses tort law’s treatment of suicide, most notably the special
rules regarding proximate cause and insanity that have developed in
negligence cases. Drawing upon studies into the causes and predictors of
suicide, Part III analyzes the shortcomings of these special rules. Finally,
Part IV argues for an approach based on traditional tort law principles that
recognizes suicide as a public health problem while also taking into account
the special nature of suicide.
I.

HISTORICAL SOCIETAL VIEWS REGARDING SUICIDE

Societal views regarding suicide are ever-changing. The ancient Greeks
were divided as to the acceptability of the practice.28 Roman attitudes were
generally more favorable, but still divided. 29 As societal attitudes toward
suicide have changed over time, so too has the law regarding the subject. The
following Part examines the evolving societal and legal views on the subject
of suicide to the present.

25

See infra notes 193–232 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78–104 & 115–23 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 310–61 and accompanying text.
28 See GEORGE MINOIS, HISTORY OF SUICIDE: VOLUNTARY DEATH IN WESTERN CULTURE 43–46
(Lydia G. Cochrane trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999) (1995) (summarizing competing schools of
thought).
29 Id. at 46–47.
26
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A. Societal Views on Suicide and Mental Illness in England Through
the Enlightenment
1. The Middle Ages
During the Middle Ages, suicide was viewed “as the result of diabolic
temptation induced by despair or as mad behavior.” 30 Accordingly, one who
took his own life was subject to public scorn. 31 The corpse of the decedent
was subjected to such punishments as being dragged through the streets,
tortured, or hanged. 32 Popular plays and works of fiction of the era portrayed
suicide as sinful and “the result of a despair inspired by the devil.” 33 Those
who committed suicide were, in the words of St. Bruno, “Satan’s martyrs.” 34
Religion heavily influenced societal views regarding suicide during this
time. The biblical commandment “Thou shalt not kill” provided the basis for
Christianity’s strong condemnation of suicide. 35 St. Augustine’s book The
City of God, published in the fifth century, took an unequivocal stance
against suicide. 36 According to Augustine, suicide was never justified,
whether it be the result of a desire “to escape from temporal difficulties” or
to avoid rape. 37 Augustine’s work influenced the Christian edicts that
followed, including the denial of Christian burial rites for those who
committed suicide and the excommunication of those who attempted
suicide. 38 Writing in the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas explained
that since life is a gift from God, “God alone has authority to decide about
life and death.” 39 Suicide, then, amounted to an offense against God. 40

30

Id. at 9.
Interestingly, class played a role in how suicide was viewed, according to one account. A noble’s
suicide, “whether he sacrificed himself for the cause he was defending or killed himself for love, in a fit
of anger, or because he was afflicted by madness, was seen as altruistic. In all cases, it was excusable.”
Id. at 16. In contrast, the peasant’s suicide was viewed as an act “born of egotism and cowardice” and an
attempt to escape his responsibilities. Id.
32 Id. at 7. In one case, the decedent’s body was ordered to be carried “to some cross way” and have
a stake driven through her breast and buried so that the stake could be seen as a warning to others against
suicide. HOWARD I. KUSHNER, SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE PROMISED LAND: A PSYCHOCULTURAL
BIOLOGY OF AMERICAN SUICIDE 18–19 (1989).
33 MINOIS, supra note 28, at 13.
34 Id. at 32.
35 See id. at 27.
36 See id.; GEORGE HOWE COLT, THE ENIGMA OF SUICIDE 157 (1991).
37 MINOIS, supra note 28, at 27–28 (quoting ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, BOOKS I–IV, at 61
(Demetrius B. Zema & Gerald G. Walsh trans., Fathers of the Church 1950)).
38 See COLT, supra note 36, at 158.
39 Id. at 159 (quoting 38 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: INJUSTICE 33 (Marcus
Lefébure ed. & trans., Blackfriars 1975)).
40 See id.
31
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At the time, the act of suicide was often attributed to insanity, with the
decedent having succumbed to melancholia or “frenesy” (frenzy). 41 But
mental illness itself was also closely linked to sin in medieval thinking. In
the early Middle Ages, mental illness was often viewed as the result of
sinfulness or demonic possession. 42 And even into the later Middle Ages,
mental illness was sometimes attributed to possession. 43
During the later Middle Ages, mental illness was usually attributed to
physiological causes. 44 The prevailing theory was that there were four
humours—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile—that influenced
human behavior. An abnormality in any of them could produce mental
disorder. For example, black bile was associated with melancholy, so an
excess of black bile could produce what today would most likely be
diagnosed as schizophrenia or depression. 45 “Frenzy” was caused by yellow
bile, resulting in an overheating of the brain. 46 Treatment ranged from herbal
remedies to exorcism. 47
2. The Enlightenment
The idea that the devil was responsible for suicide was still somewhat
common at the dawn of the eighteenth century. 48 But European attitudes
toward suicide were also gradually evolving and loosening somewhat around
41

MINOIS, supra note 28, at 38.
See id. at 30 (“In the Anglo-Saxon penitentials of the eighth and ninth centuries, only the insane
or the possessed are excused from punishment for suicide, and then only if they had lived honorably
before falling into the clutches of the devil.”). There was a distinction at the time between those who were
born with some type of mental impairment (known as fools or idiots) and those who became mentally
incompetent (or “insane”) later. See Wendy J. Turner, Mental Incapacity and the Financing of War in
Medieval England, in THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR (PART II): DIFFERENT VISTAS 387, 388 (L.J. Andrew
Villalon & Donald J. Kagay eds., 2008).
43 See Simon Kemp, Modern Myth and Medieval Madness: Views of Mental Illness in the European
Middle Ages and Renaissance, 14 N.Z. J. PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (1985) (noting that Thomas Aquinas, writing in
the thirteenth century, viewed possession as one form of insanity). Witchcraft was also believed to be the
cause of some mental illness. See Richard Neugebauer, Mental Handicap in Medieval and Early Modern
England: Criteria, Measurement and Care, in FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL DEFICIENCY: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PEOPLE WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 22, 22 (David Wright & Anne Digby eds., 1996)
(citations omitted). Some historians have argued that the extent to which madness was attributed to sin
and the supernatural in general in medieval times has been overstated. See Jerome Kroll & Bernard
Bachrach, Sin and Mental Illness in the Middle Ages, 14 PSYCHOL. MED. 507, 507 (1984).
44 Kemp, supra note 43, at 5 (discussing medieval notions of mental illness and noting that the
English legal records from the thirteenth century forward often identified the causes of insanity as
physical).
45 See id. (discussing the humours theory of mental imbalance).
46 See Claire Trenery & Peregrine Horden, Madness in the Middle Ages, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HISTORY OF MADNESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 62, 67 (Greg Eghigian ed., 2017).
47 See Kemp, supra note 43, at 6.
48 See MINOIS, supra note 28, at 191 (“[B]elief in the intervention of the devil had not completely
disappeared from either the popular mind or religious attitudes.”).
42
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this time. 49 There still remained strong opposition to the practice, but the
Enlightenment led to increased debate in philosophical and popular works
concerning the morality of suicide. 50 Importantly, it was during this era that
suicide became identified more as a physiological concern than a moral or
religious one. 51 While some of the treatments for mental illness and suicidal
tendencies seem odd by twenty-first-century standards, there was at least a
general recognition that there were physiological causes for the conditions. 52
As suicide became less associated with sin and more with insanity, there
were also increased calls to decriminalize suicide in the second half of the
eighteenth century. 53
This increased focus on physiological explanations for mental illness
also apparently led to an increased focus on the concept of insanity and its
supposed connection to suicide. As the number of people committed to
asylums and “madhouses” increased during the eighteenth century, 54 the
perception that insanity was closely connected to suicide grew. The fact that
a dead person had a history of institutionalization or treatment for mental
illness often led to a finding of suicide, “no matter how frail the other
evidence was.” 55 The connection between suicide and insanity solidified
during this time to the point that “[a] majority of intellectuals . . . thought
that madness was a component in most suicides.” 56 By the end of the
eighteenth century, the typical finding in suicide cases in England was that
the decedent suffered from insanity at the time. 57
B. Societal Views on Suicide and Mental Illness in the United States
Through the Present
The Puritans initially brought with them to the New World the view that
those who committed suicide had given in to Satan’s temptations.58 Thus,
those who committed suicide were deemed sinners and denied a Christian

49

Id. It was also around this time that the word “suicide” began to be used. Id. at 181.
See id. at 241 (explaining the trend “toward the idea that suicide was a result of madness or
physiological malfunction,” which “helped to relieve suicide of guilt”).
51 Id.
52 For example, one theory attributed mental illness to the influence of the moon on the atmosphere,
which could cause derangement of the brain. Id. Possible treatments for melancholia included showers,
chimney soot, and wood lice. Id. at 244.
53 Id. at 245; see also id. at 295–96 (discussing attitudes in France).
54 Id. at 245. According to one source, “people of the eighteenth century had the decided impression
that the insane had increased in number.” Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 28.
58 Id. at 15, 21.
50
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burial. 59 But the American colonies were developing at a time when
European attitudes were also evolving. So, while the Massachusetts Bay
Colony originally refused to recognize insanity as a defense to a charge of
suicide, the neighboring Providence Plantations declared that “a lunatic, mad
or distracted man” could not be convicted. 60 By the end of the seventeenth
century, the Rhode Island view was more in keeping with the view in
England and other colonies that mental illness provided an excuse for the
otherwise wrongful nature of the act of suicide. 61
As the country grew during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
suicide became increasingly linked with insanity. An 1844 article appearing
in The American Journal of Insanity advised that in most cases of suicide,
“the individual was known to be melancholy, and partially insane.” 62 The
best course of care for individuals who were “reserved and melancholy” and
had lost affection for family and business was “a residence in a well-directed
Lunatic Asylum—for usually such persons need medical treatment.” 63
According to one source, by the 1840s, “expert opinion concerning the
etiology of suicide became the province of that small group of physicians
charged with administering asylums for the insane.” 64
Gradually, new theories as to the causes of suicide emerged. 65 The
medical field continued to debate the causes of suicide and the extent to
which insanity was associated with suicide throughout the rest of the
nineteenth century. The field of neurology eventually developed toward the
end of the century, further influencing study of the issue. 66
As scientific views regarding the causes of suicide became more
sophisticated, the American public’s views on the subject became more
diverse. Suicide is still often linked with mental illness in the minds of many
Americans, 67 and mental illness remains a stigmatic condition in our

59

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22–23.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 35.
63 Id. at 35–36.
64 Id. at 37.
65 See id. at 42–51 (discussing theories). Émile Durkheim’s 1897 work Suicide was widely viewed
as an important step in the understanding of suicide for its argument that suicide may be caused by
multiple social factors and not simply physiological ones. See generally id. at 2–3 (discussing the
importance of Durkheim’s work).
66 See generally KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 51–52 (discussing the medical field’s views regarding
suicide during this time).
67 See Alan H. Marks, Historical Suicide, in 1 HANDBOOK OF DEATH & DYING 309, 316 (Clifton D.
Bryant et al. eds., 2003) (citing results of a survey).
60
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society. 68 Some also continue to view suicide as immoral. 69 But researchers
have found that societal attitudes can vary dramatically depending upon
one’s religious beliefs, geographic location, and other factors. 70 Overall,
however, it seems clear that Americans have become more tolerant of suicide
in terms of its morality. 71 For example, in 1950, only 36% of Americans
believed that a doctor should be allowed to end a patient’s life by painless
means if the patient has a disease that cannot be cured and the patient
requests it. 72 By 2016, that number had risen to almost 70%. 73 Americans
also increasingly view individuals as having a moral right to take their own
lives in some circumstances. A 2013 Pew Research Center poll found that
56% of respondents believed an individual has a moral right to take his or
her own life where the individual has an incurable disease. 74 Sixty-two
percent of respondents believed such a moral right exists if an individual is
suffering great pain and has no hope for improvement. 75 These numbers
reflect a 7% increase just from 1990. 76 At the same time, there is evidence
that Americans are less tolerant of suicide where the reason is that the
decedent suffers from depression or chronic pain as opposed to an incurable
disease. 77
C. The Law’s View of Suicide and Mental Illness
1. Early Legal Views in the United States
Judicial decisions involving suicide reflect a similar evolution in
thinking in the United States. Surveying legal history, the Supreme Court
observed in Washington v. Glucksberg that “for over 700 years, the AngloAmerican common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of
both suicide and assisting suicide.” 78 For example, a sixteenth-century
British decision declared suicide to be a felony because it is an offense
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See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See Marks, supra note 67, at 316.
70 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Marks, supra note 67, at 316.
71 See Marks, supra note 67, at 316.
72 Art Swift, Euthanasia Still Acceptable to Solid Majority in U.S., GALLUP (June 24, 2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/193082/euthanasia-acceptable-solid-majority.aspx [https://perma.cc/5QVAEQQS] (reporting results of Gallup poll).
73 Id.
74 PEW RESEARCH CTR., Views on End-of-Life Medical Treatments, Chapter 2: Views on the
Morality of Suicide (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/11/21/chapter-2-views-on-themorality-of-suicide [https://perma.cc/64JP-CYEA].
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Stillion & Stillion, supra note 15, at 83.
78 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997).
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“against nature, against God, and against the King.” 79 Blackstone famously
described suicide as “[s]elf-[m]urder, the pretended heroism, but real
cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers who destroyed themselves to avoid
those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure.” 80 Blackstone explained
the felonious nature of suicide, in part, as an offense against the king (“who
hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects”), and, in part, against
God (in that suicide “invad[es] the prerogative of the Almighty, and rush[es]
into his immediate presence uncalled for”). 81 English common law even
carved out a special punishment for those who took their own lives. If sane,
the decedent’s act was a crime (felo de se) and his personal property was
confiscated; if the decedent was determined to be insane (non compos
mentis), there was no forfeiture. 82
This view of suicide as a felony originally carried over into Colonial
American law. A majority of colonies retained the common law
classification of suicide as a felony. 83 Some colonies also carried over the
forfeiture provisions of English common law. 84 But, notably, colonies also
increasingly recognized insanity as an excuse for suicide. Even in Puritan
Massachusetts, coroners attempted to divine whether the decedent “knew the
consequences of the act” and thus “voluntarily and feloniously, as a felon, of
himself[] did kill and murder himself[].” 85 By the end of the eighteenth
century, most of the colonies had decriminalized suicide and rejected
forfeiture provisions based on the harsh impact on the families of those who

79

Hales v. Petit (1562) 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (QB).
Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 31–32 (Ct. App. 1960) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 189 (8th ed. 1778)).
81 Id.
82 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711–12 (summarizing the law); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 18–19
(discussing the role of insanity). During the sixteenth century in England, the vast majority of cases
involving suicide resulted in a finding that the decedent was responsible for his actions. MINOIS, supra
note 28, at 62. The fact that forfeiture was a lucrative source of income for the Crown and that the coroners
in suicide cases received compensation for every verdict of suicide perhaps explain this outcome. See
also id. (discussing relevant laws at the time and postulating “that an entire branch of the royal
administration, from the local coroner to the king’s almoner, had an interest in a strict application of the
laws on suicide”).
83 See Suzanne M. Alford, Note, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1027
(2003) (“The colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, New Hampshire, New York,
and Maryland all accepted the English common law’s treatment of suicide as a punishable crime.”).
84 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712–13.
85 KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 25 (quoting Massachusetts law). Notably, “[s]uicide remained a crime
in Massachusetts until the late nineteenth century.” Id. at 29. According to one source, juries often
stretched to conclude that suicide was the result of insanity so as to avoid the harsh effects of forfeiture.
See STEFAN, supra note 17, at 14.
80
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committed suicide. 86 But the moral and (to a lesser extent) legal disapproval
of suicide continued into the nineteenth century. 87
As the nineteenth century progressed, suicide was less frequently
deemed a crime. 88 But the special legal issues raised by suicide persisted.
Issues related to suicide most commonly came up in the context of insurance
cases in which a family sought to collect on an insurance policy covering a
decedent who had committed suicide.89 While the language in the contracts
varied, they uniformly prohibited recovery where the insured committed
suicide. The legal principle that typically emerged from these decisions (as
well as British decisions around the same time 90) was that the decedent’s
suicide voided the right to collect insurance proceeds unless the decedent’s
insanity prevented the decedent from understanding the consequences of his
actions or the decedent was compelled by an insane impulse he could not
resist. 91 Drawing upon the criminal law, some courts explained that the act
of taking one’s own life was not truly “suicide” if the decedent was insane. 92
If that were the case, recovery under an insurance policy could be permitted.
This, in turn, led to a question as to the definition of insanity. Under the
famed M’Naghten rule in the criminal context, to establish the defense of
insanity, the criminal defendant had to establish that the defendant did not
understand the nature or quality of the criminal act, or if he did, that he did
not know the act was wrong. 93 In the insurance policy cases, some courts
took the position that if the decedent could not understand the moral
implication of the act of taking his own life—if he could not distinguish
between right and wrong—the decedent was insane and his act did not

86

See MINOIS, supra note 28, at 297; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 713 (“[T]he movement away
from the common law’s harsh sanctions . . . reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish
the suicide’s family for his wrongdoing.”); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 30 (“[B]y the later eighteenth
century, jurisdictions from Massachusetts to Virginia” had started to “accept the notion that suicide was
an act whose commission was itself sufficient punishment”). Suicide was not formally decriminalized in
England until 1961. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2 c. 60.
87 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712–14 (discussing history); KUSHNER, supra note 32, at 26 (“Some
Massachusetts Protestants continued to connect suicidal thoughts with diabolical temptation far into the
eighteenth century . . . .”).
88 George P. Smith, II., All’s Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or
Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 290 (1989).
89 Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 584–88 (1872); Dean v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 Mass.
(4 Allen) 96, 107–08 (1862); Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 8 N.Y. 299, 308–09 (1853).
90 Clift v. Schwabe (1846) 136 Eng. Rep. 175, 175 (CP) (cited in Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R.
Co., 67 N.E. 424, 425 (Mass. 1903)); Borradaile v. Hunter (1843) 134 Eng. Rep. 715, 715 (CP) (cited in
Daniels, 67 N.E. at 425).
91 See Terry, 82 U.S. at 584–87 (summarizing decisions).
92 Phadenhauer v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 54 Tenn. 567, 577 (1872).
93 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (HL).
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amount to suicide in the legal sense. 94 Other courts took the position that the
ability of the decedent to understand the wrongness of the act of his taking
his own life was irrelevant; what mattered was whether the decedent
understood the nature and consequences of his act. 95 If not, the decedent was
insane, the act was not suicide, and recovery could be had under the
insurance policy.
Regardless of the exact approach, American courts were essentially
applying the English common law principles regarding forfeiture and
insanity. 96 If “insane”—however that term was defined—the decedent was
not blameworthy and his family’s right to recover under the insurance policy
should not be forfeited. If the decedent was not insane, forfeiture was
appropriate. 97
Issues of morality frequently appeared in these decisions, with courts
sometimes referring to suicide as “sinful and immoral,” 98 as well as noting
that suicide was wrong from “a religious and moral point of view.” 99 In an
1898 decision, the Supreme Court explained that an insured’s act of taking
his life should not be interpreted as being part of the parties’ contemplation
at the time the agreement was entered into, because a contract “which is
subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the sanction of a court
of justice.” 100 These decisions also tended to reflect then-current societal

94

Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 577–78.
See id. at 575 (summarizing the position of English courts on the issue).
96 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
97 The issue of how one party’s alleged insanity should influence resolution of legal issues impacting
that party has, of course, been an issue outside the narrow confines of tort and insurance law. See, e.g.,
Joshua C. Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science, 49 CONN. L. REV. 891, 891 (2017)
(discussing the concept of a delusion in making legal determinations regarding mental capacity in the
context of wills).
98 Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 424–25 (1877); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Milward,
118 Ky. 716, 722 (1904) (“The act of suicide is not only unnatural, but is highly immoral and criminal.”);
Benard v. Protected Home Circle, 146 N.Y.S. 232, 235 (App. Div. 1914) (referring to suicide as illegal
and immoral).
99 Phadenhauer, 54 Tenn. at 570–71 (quoting jury instruction); see Breasted v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr.
Co., 8 N.Y. 299, 302 (1853) (“The facts establish that the assured well knew that by throwing himself
into the river he would be drowned, and that he intended to drown himself and knew it was morally wrong
to do so.”); see also Dean v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 96, 101 (1862) (“He may have acted
from an insane impulse, which prevented him from appreciating the moral consequences of suicide.”).
100 See Ritter v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 169 U.S. 139, 154, 160 (1898) (holding that decedent’s
death, “if directly and intentionally caused by himself, when in sound mind, was not a risk intended to be
covered, or which could legally have been covered”).
95
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attitudes regarding mental illness, using such terms as “lunatic,” 101
“madman,” 102 “madly insane,” 103 and “raving madness.” 104
2. Modern Legal Views on Suicide
As societal views regarding suicide evolved, so too did the law’s
approach to cases involving suicide. While some twentieth-century opinions
continued to express moral disapproval of suicide, 105 explicit references to
suicide being an immoral act began to appear less frequently in judicial
decisions. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Cruzan v. Missouri Department
of Health 106 and Washington v. Glucksberg, 107 both of which involved endof-life issues, could hardly avoid the moral issues present. But the decisions
lacked the sort of moral admonishment of earlier decisions and recognized
that the decision to end one’s life could be rational. 108 Today, courts dealing
with cases involving a decedent’s decision to take her own life are now more
likely to acknowledge the difficult moral issues involved and to refrain from
the sort of condemnation present in earlier decisions. 109
101

Breasted, 8 N.Y. at 301.
Id. at 305.
103 Id. at 301.
104 Dean, 86 Mass. at 100. An 1872 U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning the insurance policy
issue referenced a book entitled A Practical Treatise on the Law Concerning Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons
of Unsound Mind from 1833. See Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 588 n.26 (1872) (citing JOHN
ARMSTRONG, THE ART OF PRESERVING HEALTH 131 (1796), and LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND, at xlvi
(1833)).
105 See, e.g., Blackwood v. Jones, 149 So. 600, 601 (Fla. 1933) (“No sophistry is tolerated in
consideration of legal problems which seek to justify self-destruction as commendable or even a matter
of personal right, and therefore such an argument is unsound which seeks to prove that an accusation
unfounded in fact that a person sought to destroy his or her own life is not reprehensible but a normal
thought reflecting in no wise upon the wickedness of the person accused of suicide.”).
106 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
107 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
108 See id. at 747–48 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that an adequately informed patient might
make a rational choice for assisted suicide).
109 One of the more noteworthy decisions in this regard is Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont.
2009), a case involving the constitutionality of state homicide statutes in the case of physician-assisted
suicide. There, the majority opinion spoke at length about the language surrounding the issue and the
majority’s decisions with respect to the language it used. The majority noted its decision not to use the
term “suicide” given the fact the term “suggests an act of self-destruction that historically has been
condemned as sinful, immoral, or damning by many religions.” Id. at 1226.
“Suicide” is a pejorative term in our society. Unfortunately, it is also a term used liberally by the
State and its amici (as well as the Dissent) in this case. The term denigrates the complex individual
circumstances that drive persons generally—and, in particular, those who are incurably ill and face
prolonged illness and agonizing death—to take their own lives. The term is used to generate
antipathy, and it does. The Patients and the class of people they represent do not seek to commit
“suicide.” Rather, they acknowledge that death within a relatively short time is inescapable because
of their illness or disease. And with that fact in mind, they seek the ability to self-administer, at a
time and place of their choosing, a physician-prescribed medication that will assist them in
preserving their own human dignity during the inevitable process of dying. Having come to grips
102
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Despite the changes in societal and legal views regarding suicide, the
fact that suicide is involved in a case still complicates the legal analysis.
There are still occasional references to the traditional societal disapproval
and moral issues surrounding suicide. 110 Mental illness, which is often an
underlying cause of suicide, remains a problematic and sometimes stigmatic
condition. 111 Finally, suicide raises difficult questions of causation and
foreseeability for courts.
II. TORT LAW’S TREATMENT OF SUICIDE CASES
Tort law’s historical treatment of cases involving suicide represents a
combination of society’s traditionally negative views regarding suicide and
tort law’s traditional concerns with foreseeability and expanding liability in
cases involving emotional injury. Courts developed special rules dealing
with suicide that worked to limit the scope of liability for a defendant whose
actions allegedly resulted in a decedent’s suicide. These special rules, which
were developed at an earlier time with an earlier understanding of the causes
of suicide, continue to influence the law of negligence and intentional torts.
A. Negligence Cases
Tort liability for negligence that contributes to a decedent’s suicide is
difficult to establish. In cases in which a defendant engaged in affirmative
conduct that contributed to the decedent’s suicide, plaintiffs often face
significant problems establishing the proximate cause element of a
negligence claim. While not as severe, plaintiffs face similar problems in
cases in which a defendant is alleged to have negligently failed to prevent a
suicide.

with the inexorability of their death, they simply ask the government not to force them to suffer and
die in an agonizing, degrading, humiliating, and undignified manner. They seek nothing more nor
less; that is all this case is about.
Id.

110 See Haines v. Davies, Nos. 1:07–cv–00851, 1:07–cv–00852, 2009 WL 331433, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Feb. 9, 2009) (considering motion to exclude evidence relating to suicide because “suicide is viewed by
some as a sinful, immoral, violent act, and therefore may be prejudicial”); Seals, Inc. v. Tioga Cty. Grange
Mut. Ins. Co., 519 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“To commit suicide is in the minds of many a
reprehensible, even immoral and sinful act.”); infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (discussing
still-existing special rules regarding suicide).
111 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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1.

Causation Issues in Cases Involving Affirmative Conduct
Resulting in Suicide
In order to establish liability, a negligence plaintiff must establish that
the defendant’s breach of duty was a proximate cause of her injuries. 112 While
proximate cause is a concept that is largely incapable of precise definition,
the main focus is upon foreseeability. 113 If the injuries that resulted from the
defendant’s negligence were within the scope of foreseeable risk caused by
the defendant’s behavior, proximate cause exists. 114 In situations in which a
defendant’s negligent actions have helped contribute to a decedent’s suicide,
courts have developed several special rules regarding proximate cause in
cases involving suicide that operate to limit liability.
a. The standard suicide rule
One of the earliest statements of the law regarding suicide and
proximate cause appears in the 1881 Supreme Court case of Scheffer v.
Railroad Co. 115 Scheffer killed himself after suffering physical and mental
injuries as a result of a train collision. 116 His executors brought a wrongful
death action, alleging that the negligence of the train company caused
Scheffer’s suicide. 117 The Court sustained the defendant’s demurrer, holding
that the proximate cause of Scheffer’s death “was his own act of selfdestruction.” 118 Suicide “was not the natural and probable consequence” of
the defendant’s negligence and, therefore, “could not have been foreseen,”
according to the Court. 119 Subsequent courts followed this same logic,
concluding that suicide is “so highly extraordinary or unexpected” that it
falls outside “the realm of reasonable foreseeability as a matter of law.”120
This idea that suicide is an unforeseeable consequence of a defendant’s
negligence, and therefore the efficient or superseding cause of death, is now
widely accepted among U.S. courts.121 Indeed, the rule is actually known as
112

1984).

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed.

113 See id. at 263 (“There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”); id. at 280 (discussing the
role of foreseeability).
114 See id. at 281 (discussing the concept of scope of risk).
115 105 U.S. 249 (1881).
116 Id. at 250.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 252.
119 Id.
120 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D
Negligence § 652 (1989)).
121 See Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the general
rule is that “suicide is said to be a supervening cause of the victim’s loss of his life, breaking the chain of
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“the suicide rule” in at least one jurisdiction. 122 Some formulation of this rule
has been adopted in nearly every jurisdiction. 123 This rule has been applied
responsibility that would otherwise link the loss to the negligent act”); Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28,
39 (Ct. App. 1960) (stating that “the practically unanimous rule is that [suicide] is a new and independent
agency which does not come within and complete a line of causation from the wrongful act to the death
and therefore does not render defendant liable for the suicide”); see also Brouhard ex rel. Estate of
Brouhard v. Village of Oxford, 990 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (“Generally, a decedent’s suicide
is considered an unforeseeable intervening act between the defendants’ conduct and the decedent’s
death.”); Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (“The general rule . . . is that [n]egligence
actions for the suicide of another will generally not lie since the act or suicide is considered a deliberate
intervening act exonerating the defendant from legal responsibility . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
122 Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 2009) (referring to the “Illinois
‘suicide rule’”).
123 See Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1275; Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 183 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1966); Tate, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 40; Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 436 (Colo. App. 2007);
Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Conn. 1997); Porter v. Murphy, 792 A.2d 1009, 1015 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2001); District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1275 (D.C. 1987); Appling v. Jones,
154 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 330 (Haw. 1996); Little v.
Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 203 N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ill. 1965); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
642 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind. 1994); Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 2000); Epelbaum v. Elf
Atochem, North America, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 429, 431 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (applying Kentucky law);
Bertrand v. Air Logistics, Inc., 820 So. 2d 1228, 1231, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Sindler v. Litman,
887 A.2d 97, 109–10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424,
426 (Mass. 1903); Costigan v. Plets, No. 298286, 2011 WL 6376016, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20,
2011); Truddle v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc., 150 So. 3d 692, 697 (Miss. 2014); Krieg, 781 P.2d
at 279; Long v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 930, 932, 933 (Neb. 1922); McLaughlin v. Sullivan,
461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983); Brenner v. Pub. Serv. Prod. Co., 164 A. 454, 455 (N.J. 1933); Rimbert
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1199 (D.N.M. 2008) (applying New Mexico law); Cauverien v.
De Metz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Fischer v. Morales, 526 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987); Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943, 949 (Okla. 1973); Ferris v. Cleaveland, No. 3:10-1302,
2012 WL 2564782, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2012) (applying Pennsylvania law); Scott v. Greenville
Pharmacy, Inc., 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (S.C. 1948); Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2003); Exxon Corp. v. Breecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 523–24 (Tex. 1975); Lenoci v. Leonard,
21 A.3d 694, 699–700 (Vt. 2011); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 292 P. 436, 444 (Wash. 1930); R.D. v.
W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 28 (Wyo. 1994). Nevada, Oregon, and Utah appear to be the only states not to address
the issue, although Nevada has at least considered the general issue in the context of a workers’
compensation claim. See Doe v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:15-cv-00793-APG-GWF, 2017 WL
1483428, at *8 (D. Nev. Apr. 21, 2017) (“Nevada has not yet addressed whether suicide is an intervening
act that breaks the chain of causation between a defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries.”);
Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084, 1090 (Nev. 2008) (discussing causation in the context of
workers’ compensation). Virginia’s treatment of such cases is discussed infra notes 133–36 and
accompanying text. West Virginia has recognized claims based on the failure to prevent suicide, see
Moats v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, 521 S.E.2d 180, 189 (W. Va. 1999), but has not expressly ruled on
whether the traditional suicide rule bars recovery where a defendant is alleged to have caused the suicide,
see Setser v. Harvey, No. 14-0680, 2015 WL 1741136, at *3 (W. Va. Apr. 10, 2015). At least one state,
Texas, has adopted a statute providing an affirmative defense in the case of suicide that roughly tracks
the standard suicide rule:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to a civil action for damages for personal injury or death that the
plaintiff, at the time the cause of action arose, was:
...
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in a variety of factual settings, from disseminating allegedly dangerous
fantasy games to children 124 to negligently misdiagnosing potentially fatal
diseases. 125
Issues of proximate cause are typically issues of fact for the jury to
resolve. 126 But in wrongful death cases involving suicide, courts frequently
apply the suicide rule and conclude as a matter of law that proximate
causation is lacking. 127 Sometimes the rule is applied in rote fashion without
further elaboration. 128 In other instances, courts explain that suicide is such
an abnormal act that it breaks the chain of causation and amounts to a
superseding cause. 129 Occasionally, plaintiffs are able to survive a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment on these claims, but in the typical case, a
decedent’s suicide serves to break the chain of causation and bar recovery. 130
Judge Richard Posner has explained the underlying justification for the
general rule:
A person is not liable for such improbable consequences of negligent activity
as could hardly figure in his deciding how careful he should be. Liability in such
(2) committing or attempting to commit suicide, and the plaintiff’s conduct in committing or
attempting to commit suicide was the sole cause of the damages sustained; provided, however, if
the suicide or attempted suicide was caused in whole or in part by a failure on the part of any
defendant to comply with an applicable legal standard, then such suicide or attempted suicide shall
not be a defense.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 93.001 (West 2018).
124 Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 1990).
125 Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987).
126 Wood v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 419 P.3d 503, 506 (Wyo. 2018).
127 See, e.g., Long, 187 N.W. at 932, 934.
128 Cf. Lenoci, 21 A.3d at 699–700 (choosing to elaborate before applying the rule).
129 The idea that suicide is an “abnormal thing” or usually the result of an abnormal mental condition
appears frequently in the decisions. See, e.g., Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (“With few exceptions, one who commits suicide is suffering some abnormal mental
condition.”). Many of the references to suicide being an “abnormal thing” come from a passage in Prosser
& Keeton on Torts, which courts often quote:
Some difficulty has arisen in cases where the injured person becomes insane and commits suicide.
Although there are cases to the contrary, it seems the better view that when his insanity prevents
him from realizing the nature of his act or controlling his conduct, his suicide is to be regarded
either as a direct result and no intervening force at all, or as a normal incident of the risk, for which
the defendant will be liable. The situation is the same as if he should hurt himself during
unconsciousness or delirium brought on by the injury. But if the suicide is during a lucid interval,
when he is in full command of his faculties but his life has become unendurable to him, it is agreed
that his voluntary choice is an abnormal thing, which supersedes the defendant’s liability.
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 221–22 (Tenn. 1965) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 273–74 (2d ed. 1955)); see also Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci,
414 P.2d 179, 185 (Ariz. 1966) (same); Estate of Girard v. Town of Putnam, No. CV085002754–S,
2011 WL 783599, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2011) (same).
130 Compare MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying
Tennessee law and affirming summary judgment in defendant’s favor in case involving harassing debt
collection), with Burdett v. Harrah’s Kansas Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1234, 1237 (D. Kan.
2003) (overruling motion to dismiss in case involving harassing debt collection results).
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circumstances would serve no deterrent, no regulatory purpose; it would not
alter behavior and increase safety. Nothing would be gained by imposing
liability in such a case but compensation, and compensation can be obtained
more cheaply by insurance. 131

But other considerations have also clearly influenced courts.
Longstanding concerns over the morality of suicide still linger to some extent
in more modern decisions. 132 For example, suicide remains a common law
crime in Virginia. 133 And in Virginia (as in several other states), “a party who
consents to and participates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover
damages from other participants for the consequence of that act.” 134
Negligence defendants have had some success in asserting that suicide is an
immoral or unlawful act and thus bars recovery. 135
An element of blameworthiness or culpability also arguably underlies
the general rule that suicide constitutes a superseding or efficient cause.136
Typically, the concept of a superseding or efficient cause refers to the actions
of a third party or some outside force, rather than the conduct of the
plaintiff. 137 But some courts have explained that the plaintiff’s conduct may
qualify as a superseding or efficient cause where it is highly extraordinary
and where the conduct “is more than mere contributory negligence and is of
a higher culpability level than the defendant’s negligence.”138 At least one
131

Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2001).
See Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1001–02 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (attributing some of the
special treatment of suicide cases to the association of suicide with criminality); Delaney v. Reynolds,
825 N.E.2d 554, 557 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that cases from other jurisdictions cite to “the
historic notion that suicide is an immoral or culpable act” as a policy underlying the general rule); see
also Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I. 1996) (noting that suicide remains a
common law felony in Rhode Island).
133 Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992).
134 Id. (quoting Miller v. Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Va. 1949)); see also Tug Valley Pharmacy,
LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo, 773 S.E.2d 627, 638–39 (W. Va. 2015) (Loughry, J., dissenting)
(noting that this rule has been adopted in thirteen jurisdictions).
135 See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying this rule and affirming judgment
as a matter of law in favor of defendant); Hill v. Nicodemus, 755 F. Supp. 692, 694 (W.D. Va. 1991)
(applying this rule and granting summary judgment for defendant). See generally Moats v. Preston Cty.
Comm’n, 521 S.E.2d 180, 188, 189 (W. Va. 1999) (declining to adopt this prohibition).
136 See Allen C. Schlinsog, Jr., Comment, The Suicidal Decedent: Culpable Wrongdoer, or
Wrongfully Deceased?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 471 (1991) (attributing the special causation rules
regarding suicide to the “public policy concern that the suicidal decedent was culpable”).
137 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. at
571 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (discussing the superseding cause concept and noting “employing superseding
cause to bar a plaintiff’s recovery based on the plaintiff’s conduct is difficult to reconcile with modern
notions of comparative responsibility”).
138 Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 57A AM. JUR. 2D
Negligence § 652 (1989)); see also Mesick v. State, 504 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (App. Div. 1986) (stating
rule).
132
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court has pointed to this principle in concluding that suicide qualifies as such
a cause. 139
b. The “delirium or insanity” (or “rage or frenzy”) exception
The most common exception to the rule that a decedent’s suicide
amounts to a superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation is where
the defendant’s negligence brings about “delirium or insanity” that causes
the victim to commit suicide. 140 The exception appeared in the first
Restatement of Torts in 1934 and was carried over in Section 455 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The exception provides for liability where a
defendant’s negligence results in the plaintiff’s “delirium or insanity,” which
(a) prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or risk of
harm involved therein, or
(b) makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which
deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason. 141

The comments explain that the first clause only applies when the
plaintiff’s delirium or insanity (also frequently referred to in the decisional
law as “rage” or “frenzy” 142) “is so extreme as to prevent him from
understanding what he is doing” or from understanding the consequences of
his actions. 143 In support of the rule, the second Restatement authors cited
several cases in which a defendant’s negligence caused physical harm to the
decedent, which also severely impacted the decedent’s mental capacity. 144
The ultimate question in most of these cases was whether the defendant’s
negligence caused the decedent to be unable to understand the physical
nature and consequences of his act. 145 As originally envisioned by the
authors, this first clause was an extremely limited exception to the general
139

Gilmore, 613 So. 2d at 1275.
See, e.g., Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 810 (R.I. 1996) (applying this
exception); Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing this
exception).
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
142 Prill v. Marrone, 23 So. 3d 1, 8 (Ala. 2009); City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 S.E.2d 573, 578
(Ga. 2017); Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 706–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Nguyen v.
Mass. Inst. of Tech., 96 N.E.3d 128, 139 n.12 (Mass. 2018); Maloney v. Badman, 938 A.2d 883, 887
(N.H. 2007); Bogust v. Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Wis. 1960). The same phraseology is also used in
the workers’ compensation setting in determining whether a suicide qualifies as a compensable injury.
See Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 188 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Nev. 2008).
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. b.
144 Id. § 455 reporter’s notes; Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424 (Mass. 1903);
Millman v. U.S. Mortg. & Title Guar. Co., 1 A.2d 265 (N.J. 1938); Koch v. Fox, 75 N.Y.S. 913 (App.
Div. 1902); Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 67 S.E.2d 63 (N.C. 1951); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 292 P.
436 (Wash. 1930).
145 See, e.g., Long v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 187 N.W. 930, 934 (Neb. 1922).
140
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rule that suicide breaks the chain of causation for purposes of a wrongful
death claim. Liability could be imposed only where the defendant’s
negligence caused physical harm so extensive that it actually impacted the
decedent’s mental functioning to the point that the decedent could not
understand that his actions were likely to lead to his own death.146 The
decisions also make clear that in crafting this rule, courts were borrowing
from the older insurance policy cases. 147 There appear to be few modern
cases applying this part of the exception.
The second clause in Section 455 applies when the defendant’s
negligent conduct results in a plaintiff’s delirium or insanity, which produces
an irresistible impulse to do an act. 148 The plaintiff may recover even if the
plaintiff understands the nature or likely consequences of the act, provided
“his act is done under an insane impulse which is irresistible because his
insanity has prevented his reason from controlling his actions.” 149 None of
the cases cited by the authors of the second Restatement shed much light as
to the concept of irresistible suicidal impulses, perhaps because none of the
cases cited actually resulted in a finding of such an impulse.150 Nonetheless,
the idea that an insane impulse excused the fact of suicide had been floating
around in American legal decisions for quite some time before the adoption
of the first Restatement. 151
The limited nature of the exception to the standard rule regarding
suicide and proximate cause is emphasized in a comment to Section 455. The
fact that a defendant’s negligence causes harm to an individual that results
in depression (or “extreme melancholia”) does not make the defendant liable
146

See Eckerd’s, Inc. v. McGhee, 86 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935) (stating there could be
no recovery “unless [the decedent’s] reason and memory were, at the time, so far obscured that she did
not know and understand what she was doing”). The limited nature of the exception is best illustrated by
the two non-suicide cases cited by the authors. In one, the defendant’s negligence caused the decedent to
suffer a concussion, which resulted in her becoming dizzy and falling out of a window. Millman, 1 A.2d
at 269. In the other, the decedent’s car struck the defendant’s car. Hall, 67 S.E.2d at 64–65. The decedent,
“in a dazed and addled condition,” got out of the car, walked out onto the highway, and was struck by
another oncoming car. Id. Thus, both cases involved decedents in a state of delirium that ultimately
resulted in another injury. Both decisions focused almost exclusively on the issue of proximate cause,
specifically whether the defendant’s negligence resulted in a continuous sequence of events unbroken by
any unforeseeable cause. Millman, 1 A.2d at 269–70; Hall, 67 S.E.2d at 67. Both courts did include brief
mentions of the delirium or insanity rule as described in the first Restatement of Torts, but the references
were included largely to bolster the court’s conclusion regarding proximate cause. Millman, 1 A.2d at
270; Hall, 67 S.E.2d at 67.
147 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text; Koch, 75 N.Y.S. at 921.
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. c.
149 Id.
150 In re Sponatski, 108 N.E. 466 (Mass. 1915); Delinousha v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 161 N.E. 431 (N.Y.
1928); Garrigan v. Kennedy, 101 N.W. 1081 (N.D. 1904).
151 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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for the decedent’s suicide. 152 This is true even where the decedent takes his
own life “because of his dread of the increasingly frequent recurrence of
these attacks.” 153 Unless the defendant’s negligence causes injury that results
in insanity or delirium in a form that prevents an individual from
understanding the nature of his act or that creates an irresistible suicidal
impulse, suicide breaks the chain of causation. 154
Despite the fact that this exception has been part of tort law for over a
century, courts are not at all consistent in their application of the exception. 155
Courts generally treat as synonymous the concepts of “mental illness,”
“mental derangement,” and “delirium or insanity.” 156 Some courts require
documentation of a mental illness, as opposed to a mere mental condition
(whatever difference there may be between those terms), before the
exception is triggered, 157 whereas others do not delineate between the two
concepts 158 or otherwise speak primarily in terms of the existence of a

152

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 cmt. d.
Id.
154 The case that most clearly seems to have most directly influenced the authors of the Restatement
was Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 67 N.E. 424 (Mass. 1903). There, the decedent was injured
at a railroad crossing and killed himself nearly two months later. Id. at 425. According to medical experts,
the decedent “was probably insane when he took his life.” Id. The court expressly framed the issue
regarding the right to recover in terms of proximate cause. Recognizing that the decedent was probably
insane at the time and that his insanity might very well have been caused by the collision, the court held
that the suicide was “an independent, direct, and proximate cause of the death.” Id. at 426. Drawing upon
other decisions, the court concluded that “the liability of a defendant for a death by suicide exists only
when the death is the result of an uncontrollable impulse, or is accomplished . . . without conscious
volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical nature and consequences of the act.” Id. This
is essentially the same test that appears in Section 455.
155 See Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)
(noting problems with the rule as “demonstrated by the various ways” in which courts have applied it).
156 See Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Mass. 1978) (permitting recovery where
plaintiff’s “mental illness” or “mental derangement” resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to kill herself).
157 See Estate of Ko ex rel. Hill v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 982 F. Supp. 471, 476 (E.D. Mich. 1997),
aff’d 173 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (granting summary judgment where decedent’s expert witness failed
to testify that decedent suffered from a mental illness); Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286,
1292 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (distinguishing between mental conditions and mental illnesses and saying “it is
essential that a full explanation of the claimed mental illness be offered to assist the trier of fact in
resolution of the question of causation”); Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 438 (Colo. App. 2007)
(drawing a distinction between the terms and concluding that “mental illness” is the more useful term);
Worsham v. Nix, 83 P.3d 879, 887 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
in the absence of any documentation of mental illness or delirium).
158 See Grant v. F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 146 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (Ct. App. 1978) (“No fair distinction
may be made between a mental condition, and mental illness or insanity, proximately caused by another’s
tortious conduct which results in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide.”); District of Columbia v.
Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. 1987) (“‘[M]ental illness,’ ‘mental condition,’ and ‘insanity’ are
generally considered synonymous terms, and should be so construed.”).
153
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“mental condition.” 159 Still others gloss over the initial requirement that the
decedent have been insane or under a delirium and proceed directly to the
question of whether the decedent acted pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse
or otherwise treat an uncontrollable impulse as a form of insanity itself. 160
In practice, the delirium or insanity exception is of limited value for
plaintiffs. 161 The most obvious limitation of the rule for plaintiffs is that there
must actually be some evidence that the decedent was experiencing
“delirium or insanity” that impacted the decedent’s decision-making
process. 162 As a practical matter, this will normally require expert
testimony. 163 In addition, the fact that an individual was “insane” is not
enough, by itself, to satisfy this exception. The plaintiff must show that the
mental illness actually resulted in an irresistible impulse to commit suicide
as opposed to a mere suicidal tendency. 164 For example, in one case, the
decedent’s psychiatrist testified that the decedent suffered from depression
that was a “powerful contributor” to his suicide and that “it had been his
experience that people who kill themselves feel an overwhelming sense of
hopelessness and helplessness so that they cannot think about various options
but can see only one sort of release or relief.” 165 According to the court, this
159 See McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983); Orcutt v. Spokane, 364 P.2d 1102,
1105 (Wash. 1961) (en banc); see also James A. Howell, Comment, Civil Liability for Suicide: An
Analysis of the Causation Issue, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 573, 575 (noting that some courts permit recovery
where a “mental condition” as opposed to insanity exists).
160 See Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that an
irresistible impulse is a form of mental insanity); Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434,
445 (D.S.C. 2016) (rejecting any requirement that the impulse be caused by insanity and instead focusing
on the existence of the impulse itself).
161 See Note, Tortious Inducement of Suicide: A Study of the Judicial Ostrich, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q.
166, 166–67 (stating that court decisions applying the exception “render recovery virtually impossible in
circumstances short of complete loss of bodily control”); see also Victor E. Schwartz, Civil Liability for
Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24 VAND. L. REV. 217, 227–28 (1971) (noting that
the “stringent requirements” of the test limit its reach).
162 An example of where the resort to the exception proved successful is Young v. Swiney, 23 F.
Supp. 3d 596, 615 (D. Md. 2014). There, the plaintiff’s expert was willing to testify that the decedent’s
suicide “was directly and proximately caused by the psychosis he sustained as a result” of the defendant’s
negligence. Id. at 617. The expert helpfully explained that “[t]he layman’s term for psychosis would be
‘insanity’” and that the decedent’s suicide was “due to an irresistible impulse when he was not in his right
mind.” Id. at 618.
163 See Sindler v. Litman, 887 A.2d 97, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (explaining that the issue
requires expert testimony); Orcutt v. Spokane, 364 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Wash. 1961) (en banc) (concluding
a jury question exists “where there is medical testimony that the injury sustained by the decedent caused
a mental condition which resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide”).
164 See Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Baxter v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 585, 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that expert’s testimony that depression
caused the plaintiff’s suicide was insufficient to create a jury question as to whether plaintiff was unable
to resist the impulse to take her life).
165 District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1277 (D.C. 1987).
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was insufficient to create a question for the jury on the proximate cause issue
because it did not establish that the defendant’s action caused a condition
that “resulted in the decedent’s having an irresistible or uncontrollable
impulse to commit suicide.” 166
Some plaintiffs are unable to establish that the decedent had an
irresistible impulse to commit suicide due to the fact that the act appears to
have been premeditated. Typically, the more evidence there is that the
decision to commit suicide was thought out in advance, the less likely it is
the exception will apply. 167 For example, Lenoci v. Leonard 168 involved a
teenage girl who committed suicide after a traumatic incident. She had
threatened suicide several times before the traumatic incident, going so far
on one occasion as describing her plan to do so. 169 On the night after the
incident, she texted several of her friends about the incident, texted her
boyfriend goodbye, composed a suicide note, and then carried out the suicide
plan she had previously described. 170 While it seems clear that the traumatic
incident the girl experienced was the triggering event for her suicide,
according to the Vermont Supreme Court, the events leading to her death
were “not evidence of an ‘uncontrollable impulse,’ but rather of a voluntary,
deliberate, and tragic choice by a girl who knew the purpose and the physical
effect of her actions.” 171 Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment
in favor of the defendant. 172
The final factor limiting the value of the delirium or insanity exception
for plaintiffs is that courts often decide the issue as a matter of law. 173 As is
the case with the issue of proximate cause more generally in suicide cases,
questions as to whether a decedent was experiencing delirium or insanity,
could comprehend the consequences of her actions, or was acting under an
irresistible impulse would generally seem to be questions of fact for the
jury. 174 But given the specific evidentiary requirements necessary to invoke
166

Id. at 1276.
See Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)
(citing counterexamples, but stating “the majority of courts have found that if the evidence shows the
decedent planned the suicide and knew what he was doing, no irresistible impulse existed even where it
is clear that the decedent committed suicide as a result of injuries”). But see Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d
263, 268 (N.Y. 1974) (“An irresistible impulse does not necessarily mean a ‘sudden’ impulse.” (citation
omitted)).
168 21 A.3d 694 (Vt. 2011).
169 Id. at 697.
170 Id. at 700.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 701.
173 See, e.g., supra note 166 and accompanying text.
174 See Estate of Van Dyke ex rel. Van Dyke v. Glaxo Smithkline, No. 05–CV–153–J, 2009 WL
10669421, at *5 (D. Wyo. Apr. 14, 2009) (stating that the issue of whether an individual was acting
167
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the exception, 175 courts frequently decide these issues as a matter of law
against plaintiffs. 176
2.

Causation Issues in Cases Involving the Failure to
Prevent Suicide
The other common fact pattern involving civil liability stemming from
suicide is where the defendant fails to exercise reasonable care in preventing
the decedent from committing suicide. Unlike the situation where the
defendant’s negligence allegedly causes the decedent to commit suicide,
these are cases in which the defendant did not act to prevent the suicide from
occurring. A clear example would be the situation where prison officials fail
to take reasonable steps to prevent a prisoner from committing suicide while
in custody. 177
The standard suicide rule does not have the same limiting effect in this
context as it does in other cases. Indeed, some courts refer to this situation
as an exception to the traditional suicide rule that treats suicide as a
superseding cause; where the defendant owes an affirmative duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent suicide, suicide is not a superseding cause. 178
However, the fact that suicide is involved still tends to limit liability.
Typically, courts do not recognize a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect another from harm; however, there are several types of special
relationships that can give rise to such a duty, as listed in Section 314A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 179 One noteworthy feature of the suicide
cases is that the number of relationships that courts are willing to recognize
as “special” enough to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent
another’s suicide is markedly lower than in other factual scenarios. 180 So, for
pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse should ordinarily be a jury question), rev’d on other grounds,
388 F. App’x 786 (10th Cir. 2010).
175 See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary hurdles faced by
plaintiffs).
176 See, e.g., Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 432, 436–37 (Colo. App. 2007); Lenoci,
21 A.3d at 700; Baxter v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 585, 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
177 See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593–94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing
an exception to the intervening cause rule for custodians who know or have reason to know that an inmate
might engage in self-destructive acts).
179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
180 Courts often speak about a “duty to prevent suicide.” See, e.g., Estate of Cummings v. Davie,
40 A.3d 971, 974 n.3 (Me. 2012) (“Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that, barring a special duty
such as that recognized in a jailor-inmate or psychiatrist-patient relationship, there is no duty to prevent
suicide by an adult.”); Nelson v. Driscoll, 983 P.2d 972, 980 (Mont. 1999) (discussing the “duty to prevent
suicide” in the case of custodial relationships); McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1983)
(speaking in terms of “a specific duty of care to prevent suicide”). The more accurate terminology would
be a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent suicide.
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example, while an employer might have a duty to exercise reasonable care
to assist an employee whom the employer knows is at risk of harm, 181 an
employer does not have a duty to take reasonable care to prevent an
employee from committing suicide. 182 Instead, the general rule has emerged
that only defendants who have custody over others (e.g., prison officials), or
those with special mental health training (e.g., psychiatrists), and who have
the ability to take steps to prevent the suicide owe such a duty. 183 In recent
years, there have also been a number of claims brought against school
officials and school districts who allegedly failed to take steps to prevent a
student’s suicide stemming from bullying. 184 Courts have shown a
willingness to recognize the existence of such a duty in these cases. 185 But
besides these exceptions, there is generally no duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent another from committing suicide.
The standard suicide rule does not serve as an absolute bar to recovery
in these exceptional, special relationship cases because suicide is no longer
deemed to be an unforeseeable action. 186 But the standard suicide rule
regarding causation may still limit a defendant’s liability even in these kinds
of cases. In the prison-suicide cases, for example, courts sometimes cite the
181

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B.
See Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs, Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (questioning whether
employer conducted an adequate background check on employee who died by suicide, but refusing to
recognize that a special relationship existed); Olson v. Barrett, No. 6:13–cv–1886–Orl–40KRS, 2015 WL
1277933, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015) (concluding that employer owed no duty to prevent an employee
“from later committing suicide” where employer knew of “hateful remarks from co-workers” that
allegedly contributed to employee’s vulnerable state of mind).
183 As explained by one court,
this duty has been imposed on: (1) institutions such as jails, hospitals and reform schools, having
actual physical custody of and control over persons; . . . and (2) persons or institutions such as
mental hospitals, psychiatrists and other mental-health trained professionals, deemed to have a
special training and expertise enabling them to detect mental illness and/or the potential for suicide,
and which have the power or control necessary to prevent that suicide.
McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 125 (internal citations omitted).
184 See, e.g., Lewis v. Blue Springs Sch. Dist., No. 4:17–cv–00538–NKL, 2017 WL 5011893, at *1
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2017); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 (E.D. Cal.
2014); Butler v. Mountain View Sch. Dist., No. 3:12–CV–02038, 2013 WL 4520839, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 26, 2013); Ferraro v. Glendale Unified Sch. Dist., No. B262428, 2016 WL 2944268, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 17, 2016); Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 729 (Ky. 2016); Elissa v. City of New York,
990 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (Sup. Ct. 2014); Estate of Smith v. W. Brown Local Sch. Dist., 26 N.E.3d 890,
896 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
185 See, e.g., Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (recognizing that a “strong argument” can be made that
such a duty should exist); Patton, 529 S.W.3d at 729–30 (recognizing the existence of a duty “to supervise
students so as to prevent bullying, to stop bullying as it occurred, and to report bullying to the
Administrators if it occurred”).
186 See White v. Watson, No. 16-cv-560-JPG-DGW, 2016 WL 6277601, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 27,
2016) (“Where the duty of care breached is the duty to protect against what would otherwise be an
unforeseeable consequence, that consequence becomes foreseeable to the defendant, and the breach of
the duty to protect against it can result in negligence liability.”).
182
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general suicide rule in explaining that a jailer is not liable for failing to
prevent a prisoner’s suicide absent special circumstances. 187 As one court has
explained, “‘[s]pecial circumstances’ form the basis of virtually every
decision involving a jailer’s liability for a prisoner’s acts of selfdestruction.” 188 The key is in how a court chooses to define the concept. Most
courts take the view that a jailer may be liable where the jailer knows or
should have known of a prisoner’s suicidal tendencies. 189 However, a few
essentially adopt a more stringent recklessness or deliberate indifference
standard and limit liability to where the defendant had actual knowledge that
the decedent was likely to commit suicide.190 Therefore, even though courts
often speak of the existence of a special relationship as creating an exception
to the general suicide rule, 191 the shadow of the standard suicide rule still
looms in such cases.
B. Intentional Tort Cases
Plaintiffs who allege that a defendant’s intentional misconduct resulted
in suicide face their own set of challenges. 192 The most common intentional
tort theory in suicide cases has been intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED). 193 The tort is premised on the existence of extreme and
outrageous conduct intended to cause distress “so severe that no reasonable
man could be expected to endure it.” 194 Therefore, as one court has noted,
IIED, “by its very nature, . . . [has a] closer connection to suicide than other
intentional torts.” 195 That said, plaintiffs alleging IIED as the underlying
basis for a wrongful death claim have often faced difficulty satisfying the
demanding standard that the defendant’s conduct was “extreme and
outrageous.” 196
187 See, e.g., Pretty On Top v. City of Hardin, 597 P.2d 58, 61 (Mont. 1979); Falkenstein v. City of
Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787, 792 (N.D. 1978).
188 Pretty On Top, 597 P.2d at 61.
189 See, e.g., Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
190 See, e.g., Walsh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (stating this rule in the context of school bullying case);
Murdock v. City of Keene, 623 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1993) (stating the rule in the context of prisoner
case).
191 Murdock, 623 A.2d at 756.
192 Not included in this discussion are cases in which a physician or other individual assists the
decedent in the act of suicide. These cases present their own special issues.
193 Moore v. W. Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 433 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Most cases applying intentional
tort analysis in suicide cases involve intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . .”).
194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Recklessness may also
suffice in place of intent. Id. § 46(1).
195 Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015).
196 See Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 560–61, 571–72 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that middle school
vice principal who issued an “unduly harsh” warning to a student and told the student he was going to
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Plaintiffs seeking recovery in suicide cases may face other challenges.
As is the case with negligence claims, establishing that the defendant’s
conduct was a legal cause of the decedent’s suicide sometimes proves
difficult. In the typical intentional tort case, causation typically does not pose
much of an obstacle for a plaintiff. In the case of intentional torts, courts
sometimes permit discovery in the case of “even very remote causation.”197
As Professors Prosser and Keeton explain, in the case of most intentional
torts, a defendant’s liability extends “to consequences which the defendant
did not intend, and could not reasonably have foreseen.” 198 And as every
first-year Torts student knows, a defendant takes his plaintiff as he finds
him. 199 Thus, under the famed eggshell-plaintiff rule,
[w]hen an actor’s tortious conduct causes harm to a person that, because of a
preexisting physical or mental condition or other characteristics of the person,
is of a greater magnitude or different type than might reasonably be expected,
the actor is nevertheless subject to liability for all such harm to the person. 200

end up in juvenile hall, after which the student committed suicide, did not engage in extreme and
outrageous conduct); Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 1:17–cv–01383–JBM, 2018 WL
659862, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) (bullying and alleged sexual abuse by prison guards of prisoner
with psychiatric issues not extreme and outrageous); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kan. Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp.
2d 1215, 1236 (D. Kan. 2003) (concluding on motion to dismiss that defendant’s harassing debt collection
methods did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Epelbaum v. Elf Atochem, N. Am., Inc.,
40 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433–34 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (holding that employer who permitted an allegedly hostile
work environment to exist, under which the plaintiff suffered “mere insults or indignities” and which
ultimately resulted in decedent’s suicide, did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct); Mikell v.
Sch. Admin. Unit No. 33, 972 A.2d 1050, 1055 (N.H. 2009) (granting motion to dismiss where the actions
of a special education teacher who made a false accusation against student in alleged attempt to affect
student’s disciplinary record did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Meroni v. Holy
Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 1986) (holding
that brainwashing practices of church that allegedly led to decedent’s suicide were not extreme and
outrageous); Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1972) (granting summary judgment where
defendant refused to marry decedent and ended relationship with him); see also Giard v. Town of Putnam,
No. CV085002754S, 2008 WL 5481273, at *10–11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2008) (granting motion to
dismiss on the grounds that there had not been “affirmative misbehavior” where defendant guidance
counselor failed to stop student’s suicide, despite allegation that defendant had “received unspecified
information that [the student] was suicidal”). Some plaintiffs have been unable to meet the requirement
in an IIED action that the defendant intended to cause severe emotional distress. See Corales v. Bennett,
488 F. Supp. 2d 975, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
197 Derosier v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An
actor who intentionally or recklessly causes harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms than
the harms for which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”).
198 KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, § 9, at 40.
199 See Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1988) (“It is well settled that a tortfeasor
takes a plaintiff as he finds him.”).
200 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31.
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This willingness to expand liability for intentional torts resulting in
unforeseeable harms is traditionally justified on the grounds that one who
intentionally causes harm has greater culpability than one who negligently
does so. 201 But in the case of recovery for suicide resulting from a defendant’s
intentional tort, courts have developed specific causation rules that alter the
standard approach and may significantly limit a defendant’s liability.
1. Intentional Tort Theories as an Alternative to Negligence Claims
Early wrongful death decisions tended not to draw any distinction
between suicide brought about by negligent as opposed to intentional acts. 202
Instead, they sometimes spoke of the “general rule that tort actions may not
be maintained which seek damages for the suicide of another.” 203 Thus, for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in 1921 that the
defendants, who had allegedly confined and tortured the decedent, could not
be held liable for the decedent’s act of hurling himself from a window to his
death because his suicide was an intervening cause that cut off liability for
the defendants. 204 Importing principles from the negligence cases, the court
concluded that suicide “was not the natural and probable consequence of the
wrongful acts of the defendants.” 205 A 1913 Georgia case likewise sustained
the defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that the decedent’s suicide was not
the natural result of the defendant’s conduct, and therefore was not the legal
cause of the suicide, despite the allegation in the complaint that the defendant
acted with the specific intent that the decedent would kill himself.206
Perhaps the first decision to draw a clear distinction between an
intentional tort claim and negligence in the context of a suicide case was Tate
v. Canonica, a 1960 case from California. 207 There, a California appellate
court considered a wrongful death claim in which the defendants were
alleged to have “intentionally made threats, statements and accusations
201 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So.2d 579, 587 (Miss. 1968) (“A higher
degree of responsibility is imposed upon a wrongdoer whose conduct was intended to cause harm than
upon one whose conduct was negligent.”); Mayer v. Town of Hampton, 497 A.2d 1206, 1209 (N.H. 1985)
(“The law of torts recognizes that a defendant who intentionally causes harm has greater culpability than
one who negligently does so.”).
202 See Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1921) (“[I]t is now well established that no action
lies at common law to recover damages for causing the death of a human being by the wrongful or
negligent act of another.”).
203 Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1209.
204 Salsedo, 278 F. at 99.
205 Id. at 96.
206 Stevens v. Steadman, 79 S.E. 564, 566–67 (Ga. 1913); see also Waas v. Ashland Day & Night
Bank, 257 S.W. 29, 31 (Ky. 1923) (sustaining defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that it was not
foreseeable that plaintiff would commit suicide after being falsely accused of a crime and threatened with
imprisonment).
207 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Ct. App. 1960).
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against [the] deceased for the purpose of harassing, embarrassing, and
humiliating him in the presence of friends, relatives and business
associates.” 208 The resulting emotional distress eventually led to the
decedent’s suicide. 209
The court began by noting that the law had long drawn a distinction
between intentional torts and negligence and did not place as many
restrictions on the concept of causation in the case of intentional
wrongdoing. 210 Consequently, the court refused to import the foreseeability
and superseding cause concepts from negligence law.211 Once this distinction
was recognized, it became a relatively simple matter for the court to conclude
that liability could exist for intentional misconduct resulting in suicide.
Under the court’s rule, “where the defendant intended, by his conduct, to
cause serious mental distress or serious physical suffering, and does so, and
such mental distress is shown by the evidence to be ‘a substantial factor in
bringing about’ the suicide, a cause of action for wrongful death results.” 212
Importantly, the court also decided not to import the delirium or insanity rule
used in negligence cases. Citing tort law’s longstanding reluctance to
recognize fewer defenses in the case of intentional torts as opposed to
negligence torts, the court concluded that the fact that the decedent was
insane or could not resist the impulse to commit suicide was irrelevant for
purposes of liability. 213
Following Tate, several other courts declined to import the special
causation rules from negligence cases into intentional tort claims involving
suicide. 214 In at least two instances, however, courts have modified the other
elements of the Tate approach. In Mayer v. Town of Hampton, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court analogized a wrongful death claim involving
suicide to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.215
Consequently, the court added the requirement that the defendant’s conduct
must be extreme and outrageous before liability can attach,216 thereby
narrowing the scope of liability articulated in Tate. In contrast, the Wyoming
208

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
210 Id. at 33.
211 Id. at 35–36.
212 Id. at 36 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL HARMS TO PERSONS, LAND, AND
CHATTELS §§ 279–80 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)).
213 Id. at 33, 36.
214 Other decisions recognizing the potential for liability soon followed. See Rowe v. Marder, 750 F.
Supp. 718, 724 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121, 128 (Ind. 1994); Clift v.
Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 811 (R.I. 1996); R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 31 (Wyo. 1994).
215 497 A.2d 1206, 1210–11 (N.H. 1985).
216 Id. at 1211.
209
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Supreme Court has held that one whose intentional tort causes an emotional
or psychiatric illness that is a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide
of the victim may be liable “even though he does not intend to cause the
emotional or psychiatric illness.” 217
2.

Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The Substantial
Factor Rule
Following Tate, most of the courts to consider the issue have similarly
decided against importing foreseeability principles from negligence law. But
like Tate, they have adopted a different causation standard than that which
typically applies in intentional tort cases. Under this approach, a plaintiff
may recover where a defendant acts with the intent to cause physical or
emotional harm and the conduct was a substantial factor in causing the
suicide. 218 Courts adopting the substantial factor test frequently refer to the
test as being more stringent than the ordinary causation standard in
intentional tort cases. 219 According to a federal court in Pennsylvania, the
substantial factor standard is justified because in the case of suicide, “the
final cause of death always appears as an independent act of a separate will,
always raising the very real possibility that the suicide was truly unrelated to
the defendant’s actions.” 220 According to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, “[p]roof of the substantial causation will usually be based on expert
testimony.” 221
In practice, the substantial factor standard has not proven to be a
particularly onerous requirement for plaintiffs. 222 Indeed, “the fact that a
decedent has a history of mental instability is no automatic bar to finding the
defendant’s conduct to be a substantial factor in causing the suicide.” 223 As
explained by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, “[s]o long as the
defendant’s wrongful act was a substantial cause of the suicide, there is no
217

R.D., 875 P.2d at 31.
See Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724 (discussing the approach of most courts); see also N. Shore
Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Breslin Assocs. Consulting LLC, No. 02–11760–NG, 2004 WL 6001505, at *5
(D. Mass. June 22, 2004) (applying the rule); Collins v. Village of Woodridge, 96 F. Supp. 2d 744, 756
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (same); Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 184–85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966)
(adopting the substantial factor test); Kimberlin, 637 N.E.2d at 127–28 (citing prior decisions and
applying the rule); Clift, 688 A.2d at 812 (citing Tate and adopting its test).
219 See Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724 (explaining that the substantial factor test imposes “a greater
standard of causation than might otherwise be required”); Clift, 688 A.2d at 812 (explaining that the
substantial factor test is “certainly a more stringent test than that employed in typical intentional infliction
of emotional distress cases”).
220 Rowe, 750 F. Supp. at 724.
221 Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1211.
222 But see Dargie v. County of Hillsborough, No. 93-391-SD, 1995 WL 73339, at *8 (D.N.H. Feb.
23, 1995) (holding that plaintiff failed to meet the substantial causation standard).
223 Mayer, 497 A.2d at 1211.
218
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reason in such a case to undermine to [sic] the policy behind intentional torts
which extends a defendant’s liability almost without limit to any actual harm
resulting.” 224
3.

Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The
Foreseeability Rule
Other courts have adopted an alternative approach that applies
foreseeability principles from negligence law to intentional tort cases to limit
defendants’ liability. A 2015 decision from a South Carolina federal district
court directly imported the standard suicide rule from negligence cases in
holding that suicide constitutes an intervening force that breaks the chain of
causation. 225 To prevail, the plaintiff must fit within either the irresistible
impulse or special relationship exceptions. 226
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted a similar foreseeability
standard in suicide wrongful death cases involving intentional wrongdoing
on the part of a defendant. Rejecting the traditional causation standard that
applies in intentional tort cases, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
“plaintiff must plead facts which, if proven, would overcome application of
the general rule that suicide is deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law.”227
The plaintiff must ultimately establish that the suicide was foreseeable,
which, under the court’s approach, means that suicide “was a likely result of
the defendant’s conduct.” 228
4.

Special Intentional Tort Rules in Suicide Cases: The Irresistible
Impulse Rule
A handful of courts have held that there can be no recovery for wrongful
death suicide unless the decedent acted from an uncontrollable impulse and
the defendant’s intentional tort was a substantial cause of the decedent’s
impulse. 229 Mississippi first adopted this rule in 1968 in a case involving
abuse of process on the part of various defendants to collect debts from the
decedent that ultimately led to the decedent’s suicide. 230 In reaching its
decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court referred to several negligence cases
as well as Tate and several pre-Tate intentional tort cases involving

224

Id.
Watson v. Adams, No. 4:12–cv–03436–BHH, 2015 WL 1486869, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2015).
226 Id. at *8.
227 Turcios v. DeBruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015).
228 Id.
229 State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579, 587 (Miss. 1968); see also Hare v. City
of Corinth, 814 F. Supp. 1312, 1326 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (applying this rule); Cauverien v. De Metz,
188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (same).
230 Richardson, 214 So. 2d at 584.
225
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suicide. 231 Ultimately, the court cobbled together a rule that combined
aspects of both lines of cases, borrowing the uncontrollable impulse concept
from negligence cases and the substantial factor language from Tate. 232
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO SUICIDE IN TORT LAW
As one reviews the cases involving potential liability for suicide,
several fact patterns reappear frequently. There is the harassing, abusive, or
bullying behavior that results in suicide. 233 There is the negligent entrustment
or sale of a firearm or drugs to the individual who later kills himself. 234 There
is the friend, counselor, or other confidant who fails to take action to prevent
the decedent from committing suicide. 235 There is the landlord, 236
employer, 237 or other individual who arguably has a special relationship with

231

Id. at 586–87.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Mississippi case law on the subject of liability for
negligence in suicide cases seemed, until recently, to be quite restrictive. See Truddle v. Baptist Mem’l
Hosp.–De Soto, Inc., 150 So. 3d 692, 697 (Miss. 2014) (“Nothing in Mississippi caselaw, save the
irresistible-impulse doctrine . . . abrogates the general rule that suicide constitutes ‘an independent,
intervening and superseding event that severs the causal nexus between any wrongful action on the part
of the defendant.’” (quoting Shamburger v. Grand Casino of Miss., Inc./Biloxi, 84 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798
(S.D. Miss. 1998))); Collins ex rel. Irby v. Madakasira, No. 2015–CA–01759–COA, 2017 WL 9480890,
at *7 (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017) (“Truddle clearly states that an intentional act must be pled to support
a cause of action for suicide.”). In 2018, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized that liability could
attach in a case in which the decedent was under the custody and control of a medical facility and the
facility’s negligence helped lead to the decedent’s suicide. Singing River Health Sys. v. Vermilyea,
242 So. 3d 74, 83 (Miss. 2018).
233 See, e.g., MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 736 (6th Cir. 2007) (harassing debt
collection); Burdett v. Harrah’s Kan. Casino Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1235 (D. Kan. 2003) (harassing
debt collection); Halko v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 135, 141–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(harassing supervisors); Doe v. Doe, 67 N.E.3d 520, 524 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (bullying of minor); Laytart
v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994) (sexual abuse of a minor);
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tenn. 1965) (domestic abuse).
234 See, e.g., Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (sale of firearm
ammunition); Kelly v. Echols, No. CIV-F-05-118 AWI DLB, 2008 WL 4163221, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
4, 2008) (sale of prescription drugs); Prill v. Marone, 23 So. 3d 1, 7 (Ala. 2009) (negligent entrustment);
see also Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1277 (Ala. 1993) (negligent entrustment); Tonn v.
Moore, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0372, 2013 WL 1858773, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013) (negligent
entrustment); Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 564, 567–68 (Iowa 1997) (sale of
ammunition to minor); Delaney v. Reynolds, 825 N.E.2d 554, 559 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (negligent
entrustment); Splawnik v. DiCaprio, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (App. Div. 1989) (negligent entrustment);
Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (sale of ammunition to minor).
235 See, e.g., Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (companion); Nally v.
Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948, 957 (Cal. 1988) (religious counselor); Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d
324, 341–42 (Haw. 1996) (veterans’ counselor); Lenoci v. Leonard, 21 A.3d 694, 698 (Vt. 2011) (friend).
236 See Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (holding that landlord did not have duty to
prevent suicide).
237 See Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding employer not
liable for security guard’s suicide using company-issued firearm); Olson v. Barrett, No. 6:13–cv–1886–
232
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the decedent 238 who fails to take action to prevent the decedent’s suicide. And
there is the more generic case in which the defendant’s negligence causes
physical or emotional harm to the decedent that ultimately leads to the
decedent’s death. 239
Each of these cases involves its own tragic set of facts. Each is painful
to read. But most share one common thread: the plaintiff loses on the issue
of duty or proximate cause. 240 There are certainly exceptions, such as the
cases in which a defendant retains custody of an individual and has reason
to know of the individual’s suicidal tendencies. 241 But the fact that the
decedent has committed suicide usually makes it quite difficult for the
plaintiff to recover, at least where the defendant’s affirmative conduct is
alleged to have resulted in suicide.
As the following Part argues, while the actual results in many suicide
cases are not particularly problematic, the manner in which courts arrive at
those results and the message that the suicide rule sends about suicide and
mental health are often troublesome. In addition, the failure of courts to
engage in any meaningful analysis regarding proximate cause in these cases
and the special causation rules some courts have developed in intentional tort
cases sometimes lead to problematic results.
A. Nonproblematic Results
The standard suicide rule in tort law is a rule regarding proximate
cause. 242 As explained by Professor Dan Dobbs, “[t]he most general and
pervasive approach to . . . proximate cause holds that a negligent defendant
is liable for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked by his
negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that
conduct.” 243 The general rule treating suicide as an unforeseeable kind of
harm is generally consistent with the medical research regarding suicide.
In 2003, the American Psychiatric Association developed assessment
guidelines to help mental health professionals assess the risk of suicide in
Orl–40KRS, 2015 WL 1277933, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2015) (noting that suicide did not occur “in
the scope or course of employment”).
238 See McPeake v. Cannon, 553 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (attorney); McLaughlin v.
Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 127 (N.H. 1983) (attorney).
239 See Scheffer v. R.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881) (holding railway company not liable for
suicide of passenger injured in train collision).
240 See, e.g., Laytart v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994)
(affirming dismissal on the pleadings in case of sexual abuse of a minor resulting in suicide on the grounds
that suicide is intervening act that breaks the chain of causation).
241 See, e.g., P.W. v. Children’s Hosp., 364 P.3d 891, 896 (Colo. 2016).
242 See supra notes 115–30 and accompanying text.
243 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 198 (2d ed. 2011).
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patients. 244 The guidelines were developed after a review of over thirty years
of research and literature in the field. 245 However, considerable doubt within
the psychiatric field as to how effective existing risk assessment methods are
at predicting the risk of suicide in specific cases has existed for some time. 246
A 2016 meta-analysis examined thirty-seven longitudinal studies involving
psychiatric patients or people who had made suicide attempts and who had
been classified as being at high or low risks of suicide. 247 The study found
that the proportion of suicides among the high-risk patients was 5.5%, in
contrast with 0.9% among lower risk patients, suggesting “a statistically
strong association between high-risk strata and completed suicide.” 248
However, the meta-analysis also revealed “that about half of all suicides are
likely to occur in lower-risk groups” and that “95% of high-risk patients will
not suicide.” 249 Thus, despite over forty years of study, the authors concluded
that “[a] statistically strong and reliable method to usefully distinguish
patients with a high-risk of suicide remains elusive.” 250
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. A separate 2016 metaanalysis published in the British Journal of Psychiatry found that
there is no robust evidence to support the use of one risk scale over another, and
because all the scales reviewed had a low [positive predictive value] with
significant numbers of false positives these scales should not be used in clinical
practice alone to assess the future risk of suicide. 251

Researchers who attempted to identify patients at risk for suicide among
4800 veterans admitted for in-patient psychiatric care were unsuccessful in
their efforts, leading to the conclusion that “[i]dentification of particular

244 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF
PATIENTS WITH SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS (2003), https://psychiatryonline.org/pb/assets/raw/sitewide/
practice_guidelines/guidelines/suicide.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCM8-28JW].
245 Id. at 7.
246 See Albert M. Drukteinis, Psychiatric Perspectives on Civil Liability for Suicide, 13 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 71, 80 (1985) (“In general, psychiatric prediction of a patient’s potential for
suicide is being questioned more and more.”).
247 Matthew Large et al., Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Cohort Studies of Suicide Risk Assessment
Among Psychiatric Patients: Heterogeneity in Results and Lack of Improvement over Time, PLOS ONE
(June 1, 2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0156322 [https://perma.
cc/9932-F8HH].
248 Id. at 1–2, 12.
249 Id. at 12.
250 Id. at 2.
251 Melissa K.Y. Chan et al., Predicting Suicide Following Self-harm: Systematic Review of Risk
Factors and Risk Scales, 209 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 277, 281 (2016), https://www.cambridge.org/
core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/C9D595168EDF06401A823E2E968915E1/
S000712500024511Xa.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ45-5TGS].

802

113:767 (2019)

Abolishing the Suicide Rule

persons who will commit suicide is not currently feasible.” 252 There are
certainly identifiable factors that increase the risk of suicide. For example, a
2009 study found that of patients who had been hospitalized after a suicide
attempt, nearly one-third of those who had psychotic symptoms attempted
suicide at least one more time, thus leading to the conclusion that
“[p]sychotic symptoms during major depressive episode increase the risk of
completed suicide after serious suicide attempt.” 253 But predicting those who
are most at risk of suicide remains frustratingly difficult. 254
The fact that suicide remains an unpredictable occurrence to trained
experts speaks to the foreseeability of suicide for purposes of tort law.
Predictability is not the same thing as foreseeability. 255 But foreseeability
does involve some measure of probability of an event’s occurrence. And if
an event occurs infrequently enough under a given set of facts to be
unpredictable, this impacts the foreseeability of the event. 256 Moreover,
foreseeability is typically assessed from the perspective of the hypothetical
reasonable person. If experts with superior knowledge regarding suicide
have been unable to develop a reliable method for determining those at a
high risk of suicide, the hypothetical reasonable person will ordinarily not be
able to do better. 257
Even where emotional distress is within the foreseeable scope of risk
resulting from a defendant’s conduct, it is the unusual case in which suicide
is the kind of harm foreseeably risked. One can easily foresee that an
intentional wrong or the failure to exercise reasonable care could result in
emotional distress. But the foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis involved in
proximate cause determinations involves consideration of degrees. Burning
resulting from an explosion caused by an unpredictable chemical reaction is
a different kind of harm than injury resulting from being accidentally
252

Alex D. Pokorny, Prediction of Suicide in Psychiatric Patients. Report of a Prospective Study,
40 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 249 (1983), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/
fullarticle/492987 [https://perma.cc/2H8F-WHKN].
253 Kirsi Suominen et al., Outcome of Patients with Major Depressive Disorder After Serious Suicide
CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY
1372,
1372
(2009),
Attempt,
70 J.
http://www.psychiatrist.com/JCP/article/Pages/2009/v70n10/v70n1005.aspx [https://perma.cc/8MLFSNSM].
254 See Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Suicide: Unpredictable and Unavoidable—Proposed
Guidelines Provide Rational Test for Physician’s Liability, 71 NEB. L. REV. 643, 644 (1992) (“In fact,
predictions of the likelihood a specific individual will commit suicide are wrong far more often than they
are right.”).
255 See Drukteinis, supra note 246, at 80 (stating that “the legal use of the term foreseeability and the
concept of predictability are not synonymous”).
256 See id.
257 See id. (stating that “if professionals trained in mental health cannot prevent suicide or even
predict it accurately, then the average citizen certainly has no way of predicting it”).
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splashed by hot liquid. 258 It is not simply the fact that one injury is more
substantial than the other that may take one of the harms outside the scope
of risk. It is the fact that the essence or fundamental nature of the injuries are
different in kind. Suicide involves emotional distress plus the intentional act
of the decedent. In this respect, suicide is ultimately a harm that is different
in kind than the emotional distress that tort law recognizes as a compensable
injury. It is the unusual case where suicide is the kind of harm that a
defendant foreseeably risked by his negligent conduct. Thus, as a general
proposition, the special causation rules in suicide cases usually produce the
correct result.
B. Problematic Reasoning (and Sometimes Problematic Results)
1. Problematic Reasoning: Proximate Cause
Rote application of the suicide rule produces the correct result in the
run of cases. But not always. In some instances, a court’s application of the
rule effectively short-circuits any real analysis into whether the decedent’s
suicide was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s
negligence.
For example, in R.D. v. W.H., a Wyoming case, the decedent’s family
was able to state a claim by successfully invoking the delirium or insanity
exception to the traditional suicide rule in a negligence case after the court
had explained that suicide is ordinarily treated as an intervening cause that
breaks the chain of causation. 259 But it is difficult to understand why there
was a need to resort to the exception in the first place when application of
traditional foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis would almost certainly have
resulted in a jury question. According to the complaint, the defendant (the
decedent’s stepfather) had allegedly sexually abused the decedent
throughout her entire life to the point that she developed psychiatric
difficulties and attempted suicide on several previous occasions. 260 The
defendant loaned a gun to the decedent, which she used to try to kill herself;
five days later, the defendant helped the decedent obtain a prescription for
medicine—the same medicine that the defendant knew or should have
known the decedent had used in a previous attempt to kill herself. 261 On this
occasion, she was successful. 262 There is nothing wrong with articulating a
general rule that suicide is not the sort of resulting harm that is foreseeable
from one’s negligence. But in this instance, common sense would suggest
258
259
260
261
262
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See Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1964] 1 Q.B. 518 (Eng.).
875 P.2d 26, 28–29 (Wyo. 1994).
Id. at 28.
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that suicide was the exact harm a reasonable person could foresee by
assisting the decedent in obtaining the prescription. As such, the decedent’s
acts cannot be viewed as a superseding cause if that term is to have any
meaning. 263
The fact that the defendant in R.D. v. W.H. had, according to the
complaint, contributed to the decedent’s psychiatric problems through
repeated sexual abuse only strengthens the case for foreseeability. Suicide is
admittedly difficult to predict. 264 But there is also a correlation between
sexual and other forms of abuse with long-term psychological problems and
risk of suicide. 265 As an example, according to one study, “heterosexual
women who had experienced physical violence by a partner were more than
seven times more likely to report current suicidal ideation than their
counterparts who had not experienced” such violence.266
Courts’ tendency to apply the traditional suicide rule in cases of alleged
negligence involving abusers and to apply similar foreseeability concepts to
claims founded on intentional misconduct precludes jurors from hearing
expert testimony that might shed light on the causal connection (if any)
between the defendant’s conduct and the ensuing suicide. For example, in a
Tennessee case, the decedent’s boyfriend “had broken her leg, burned her
with a cigarette, blacked her eyes, kicked her, [] caused her to be bruised and
discolored over large areas,” and forcibly retrieved her from another state
after she had attempted to leave him. 267 Eventually, the decedent jumped to
her death after writing a suicide note ascribing her actions to the abuse she

263 See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. 2006) (“Where the
intervening act’s risk is the very same risk that renders the original actor negligent, the intervening act
cannot serve as a superseding cause.”).
264 See supra notes 244–54 and accompanying text.
265 See Peter J. Fagan et al., Pedophilia, 288 JAMA 2458, 2460 (2002) (noting that child victims of
sexual abuse are at higher risk for mood disorders and suicide).
266 See Courtenay E. Cavanaugh et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Suicidal Behavior Among Adult
Female Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 41 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 372, 372–73
(2011); see also John Briere & Lisa Y. Zaidi, Sexual Abuse Histories and Sequelae in Female Psychiatric
Emergency Room Patients, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1602, 1602 (1989) (noting that studies “tend to
document high rates of anxiety, depression, dissociation, self-destructiveness, substance abuse, and
interpersonal dysfunction in [male and female] adults who were molested as children” as well as more
frequent diagnoses of borderline personality disorder); Elizabeth Oddone Paolucci et al., A Meta-Analysis
of the Published Research on the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, 135 J. PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (2001) (reporting
“clear evidence confirming the link between” childhood sexual abuse and posttraumatic stress disorder,
depression, suicide, sexual promiscuity, victim–perpetrator cycle, and poor academic performance);
Melissa K. Holt et al., Bullying and Suicidal Ideation and Behaviors: A Meta-Analysis, 135 PEDIATRICS
e496, e496 (2015) (conducting meta-analysis and concluding “that involvement in bullying in any
capacity is associated with suicidal ideation and behavior”).
267 Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tenn. 1965).
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had suffered. 268 Nonetheless, the Tennessee Supreme Court, applying the
suicide rule without further inquiry, affirmed the trial court’s decision to
sustain the defendant’s demurrer on the grounds that the decedent’s suicide
was unforeseeable and “an abnormal thing.” 269
In an Ohio case, the complaint alleged that a teenager died by suicide
as a result of having been sexually abused by an adult. 270 In a brief opinion
affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, the Ohio appellate court
perfunctorily cited the standard rule that suicide is generally an intervening
cause that breaks the chain of causation. 271 The court then noted that there
was no allegation in the complaint that the alleged abuser knew or should
have known the teen was suicidal when he was abusing the teen, nor was
there any allegation that suicide “is a normal incident of the risk involved in”
sexual abuse of a teen. 272 As such, dismissal was proper. 273
These kinds of cases present special circumstances that take them
outside of the confines of the standard rule regarding suicide and causation.
Where the risk of the decedent’s act is the same risk that renders the
defendant’s conduct negligent to begin with, the intervening act cannot serve
as a superseding cause. 274 If a defendant’s own extreme conduct foreseeably
risks severe emotional injury, the foreseeability arguments and arguments
about the extreme nature of the decedent’s own acts carry considerably less
weight. When current science and everyday experience suggest that a
defendant’s conduct substantially increased the risk of suicide, it is the worst
sort of legal fiction to argue that the decedent’s actions were a superseding
cause and that a jury could reach no other conclusion.
2. Comparative Fault Problems
A problem related to this short-circuited proximate cause analysis
involves the defense of comparative fault. Courts sometimes explain that the
decedent’s suicide was “the sole proximate cause” of death.275 The idea that
268

Id.
Id. at 222.
270 Laytart v. Laytart, No. 5-94-11, 1994 WL 463777, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1994).
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. 2006) (“Where the
intervening act’s risk is the very same risk that renders the original actor negligent, the intervening act
cannot serve as a superseding cause.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor’s liability is limited to those physical harms
that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
275 See, e.g., La Quinta Inns, Inc. v. Leech, 658 S.E.2d 637, 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he evidence
demands a finding that Mr. Leech’s act of suicide was the sole proximate cause of his death . . . .”); Jones
269
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the decedent’s suicide is the sole proximate cause of death was devised at a
time when the all-or-nothing defense of contributory negligence was the
norm. 276 Given the choice of assigning responsibility for a suicide to one of
the two parties, the choice to assign it to the decedent made sense. The use
of the term “sole proximate cause” was certainly unfortunate in that it implies
that there can be only one proximate cause of an injury. 277 But the idea was
nonetheless defensible.
With tort law’s switch to comparative fault, however, the idea that the
decedent’s suicide was always the sole proximate cause ceased to be
persuasive. Cases outside of the suicide context in which the acts of both the
plaintiff and defendant were found to be proximate causes of the plaintiff’s
injuries and the plaintiff’s recovery was proportionally reduced became
commonplace following the switch to comparative fault. 278 Underlying the
switch from a contributory negligence to comparative negligence regime
were concerns over fairness; while the plaintiff’s own fault should justifiably
limit recovery, the defendant could sometimes rightfully be expected to bear
some portion of the responsibility. 279 Yet, the idea that the decedent’s
decision to take her life was the sole proximate cause of death remained
rooted in tort law with little acknowledgment that both parties could share
legal responsibility for an outcome. In this respect, blind application of the
idea that suicide is the sole proximate cause of the decedent’s death serves
as the functional, if not intentional, equivalent of the old contributory
negligence bar. As Professor Joe King notes, “[t]he serious misconduct bar
reinvests the effect of the plaintiff’s fault with a complete bar potential
despite a comparative fault scheme, and thus legitimizes an avenue for the
court to end-run the jury.” 280 As a result, application of the principle may
sometimes undermine the fairness and proportionality concerns underlying
comparative fault rules. 281

v. Stewart, 191 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tenn. 1946) (“This intervening act of the deceased, and not the tort of
the defendant, must be regarded as the sole proximate cause of that death.”).
276 The switch from contributory negligence to comparative negligence began in the 1960s and
1970s. See Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which Is the
Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 43 (2003).
277 See generally Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. 1988) (“The facts of this
case illustrate the principle that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury.”).
278 See, e.g., Breaux v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc.-Gulfport, 854 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Miss. Ct. App.
2003) (explaining that when there is more than one proximate cause, comparative negligence principles
apply).
279 See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar
in Tort Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1062–63 (2002).
280 Id. at 1067–68.
281 See id. at 1063.

807

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

C. Problematic Messages
1. Value Judgments
The special causation rules that apply in the case of suicide represent a
departure from traditional tort principles. It is certainly not uncommon for
special tort rules to develop based on policy or moral judgments. But the
concern in suicide cases is that courts may be applying moral judgments that
were developed centuries ago at a time when societal views on suicide were
evolving.
There are other examples in which tort law departs from its traditional
principles for particular groups of plaintiffs. For example, standard tort
principles would permit a plaintiff to hold a defendant liable where the
plaintiff was injured after engaging in unwise or dangerous conduct and this
conduct was foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the defendant’s
negligence. 282 It is the unusual case in which the plaintiff’s own negligence
is treated as the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. But where,
for example, a bartender serves an obviously intoxicated patron and that
patron drives under the influence and injures himself, the majority rule is that
the patron may not recover from the individual who provided the alcohol. 283
Some courts explicitly ground their conclusions on the notion that a patron’s
actions in such cases are the sole proximate cause of the injuries. 284
This rule in dram shop cases is obviously driven more by policy than
by logic. One of the foreseeable risks one contributes to by serving alcohol
to a visibly intoxicated individual is obviously that the individual will injure
himself in addition to others. Yet, the majority rule is grounded on the notion
282

The plaintiff’s recovery might be limited by comparative negligence principles in such instances.
See Bertelmann v. TAAS Assocs., 735 P.2d 930, 934 n.3 (Haw. 1987) (stating that the majority
rule is that “neither minors nor adults who hurt themselves after becoming intoxicated possess a cause of
action against whoever provided them with liquor”). Statutes play an important part in the law in this
area. See Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 348 (Miss. 1986) (“[W]e do not think the
legislature intended to impose liability upon a dispenser of intoxicants to an adult individual, such as
appellant here, who voluntarily consumes intoxicants and then, by reason of his inebriated condition,
injures himself.”); Richard Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal
for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 563 (2000) (“Relatively few states allow an intoxicated adult
patron to recover from the dramshop for injuries caused by his own intoxication.”).
284 See Bennett v. Godfather’s Pizza, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“The
rationale for not holding the establishment liable is that the voluntary drinking of the alcohol, not the
furnishing of [the alcohol], [is] the proximate cause of the injury.” (internal quotations omitted));
Bertelmann, 735 P.2d at 933 (“Drunken persons who harm themselves are solely responsible for their
voluntary intoxication and cannot prevail under a common law or statutory basis.”); Smith v. Tenth
Inning, 551 N.E.2d 1296, 1298–99 (Ohio 1990) (treating the plaintiff’s consumption of alcohol as the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries in such cases); McClelland v. Harvie Kothe-Ed Rieman, Post
No. 1201, Veterans of the Foreign Wars of the U.S., Inc., 770 P.2d 569, 572 (Okla. 1989) (“Claims do
not lie against liquor vendors because—at common law—it is the drink’s voluntary consumption rather
than its sale that constitutes the proximate cause of the injuries sought to be redressed.”).
283
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that a person should not be permitted to benefit “by his or her own wrongful
act.” 285
Professor King has explored the idea that courts sometimes recognize a
special doctrine barring tort claims arising out of serious misconduct. 286 King
cites as one of his many examples a case in which a teenager was killed by
an unsecured vending machine that fell when he was attempting to steal
drinks. 287 The Alabama Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s subsequent
products liability claim was barred on the grounds that “[a] person cannot
maintain a cause of action if, in order to establish it, he must rely in whole
or part on an illegal or immoral act.” 288 As in the dram shop cases, the
primary justification for what King calls this “serious misconduct bar” is the
notion that a wrongdoer engaged in serious misconduct should not be
permitted to benefit from his wrongdoing by recovering damages. 289 King’s
survey of the decisional law reveals that sometimes the “serious misconduct
bar” he identifies operates less explicitly. 290 In some cases, courts formally
treat the plaintiff’s misconduct as the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
own injuries, despite the negligence of the defendant. 291 But as King
observes, what courts are actually doing is applying the serious misconduct
bar under the guise of proximate cause.292
The judicial treatment of suicide cases follows a similar format. A few
courts have expressly applied the serious misconduct bar in suicide cases.293
More commonly, courts treat a decedent’s suicide as so extreme or abnormal

285 Buntin v. Hutton, 206 Ill. App. 194, 199 (App. Ct. 1917); see also Smith, 551 N.E.2d at 1298
(“Clearly, permitting the intoxicated patron a cause of action in this context would simply send the wrong
message to all our citizens, because such a message would essentially state that a patron who has
purchased alcoholic beverages from a permit holder may drink such alcohol with unbridled, unfettered
impunity and with full knowledge that the permit holder will be ultimately responsible for any harm
caused by the patron’s intoxication.”).
286 King, supra note 279, at 1015.
287 Id. at 1023 (discussing Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So. 2d 953, 954
(Ala. 1993)).
288 Oden, 621 So. 2d at 954–55 (quoting Hinkle v. Ry. Express Agency, 6 So. 2d 417, 421 (Ala.
1942)).
289 King, supra note 279, at 1017. The dram shop cases are, in some instances, examples of the
serious misconduct bar in action. See Alison K. Goodwin, Comment, One Drunk Driver, Shame on You,
Two Drunk Drivers, Shame on Who: Reconciling the Unlawful Acts Doctrine with Comparative Fault,
48 N.M. L. REV. 173, 188 (2018) (discussing New Mexico’s “complicity doctrine” in the context of dram
shop cases).
290 King, supra note 279, at 1016.
291 See id. at 1063–64 (discussing cases).
292 Id. at 1064.
293 See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. As Professor King notes, there are relatively few
cases in which courts explicitly invoke the serious misconduct rule in barring a plaintiff’s claim in a
suicide case. King, supra note 279, at 1028–29.
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as to be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.294 The history of
the suicide rule leaves little doubt that the rule developed, at least in part,
from the historical view that suicide was a criminal or immoral act.295
Regardless of whether a court expressly applies the serious misconduct bar
or does so under the guise of proximate cause, those who commit suicide are
grouped with drunk drivers, thieves, and others whose acts take them outside
the protection of the law. 296
The fact that courts sometimes make policy judgments as part of the
proximate cause element is hardly surprising. The proximate cause element
exists in large measure to ensure that liability is not limitless, and the limits
that courts impose are often based on policy concerns and notions of
fairness. 297 But in the case of the special causation rules for suicide cases,
courts are applying legal rules that have their origin at a time when suicide
was widely viewed as sinful and a crime. 298 While U.S. society continues to
view suicide as a tragedy, societal attitudes have evolved since the days when
courts could describe the act as sinful or immoral without fear of
contradiction. 299
Citing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Judge David L. Bazelon
once observed that “the continued vitality of the common law, including the
law of torts, depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary community

294

See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
296 The delirium or insanity exception to the general suicide rule likewise reflects a morality-based
judgment upon those who commit suicide. The insanity or delirium exception is less a rule about causation
than it is a value judgment as to the relative blameworthiness of the parties. The question of whether a
defendant’s conduct resulted in the decedent being insane or unable to resist an impulse to commit suicide
has virtually no relation to the question of whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in a foreseeable risk
of suicide. Instead, like the M’Naghten rule in criminal law, the insanity or delirium exception reflects a
value choice as to the blameworthiness or culpability of the decedent. See generally Bruce J. Winick, The
Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier,
50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 832 (2009) (explaining that the M’Naghten test “focus[es] on cognitive impairment
produced by mental illness that reduces culpability to the extent that the offender is not blameworthy for
his conduct”). The fact that the decedent was supposedly insane at the time of suicide absolves the
decedent of all legal and moral blame for the suicide. See Baker v. Bd. of Fire Pension Fund Comm’rs,
123 P. 344, 345 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912) (explaining that the decedent “cannot be said to have been the
cause, either morally or legally, of his own death” when his actions were the result of his insanity).
297 See, e.g., Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Proximate cause is
bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society is willing to extend liability for a defendant’s
actions.”); Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1966) (“Some boundary must be set to
liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.” (quoting
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 240–41 (3d ed. 1964))).
298 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
295
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values and ethics.” 300 Tort law in particular “operates as a vehicle through
which communities perpetually reexamine and communicate their values.”301
Yet, courts have developed a morality-based rule and encased it in amber in
the face of evolving societal attitudes and better psychological understanding
of suicide. In the process, they may sometimes send a message about the
nature of suicide that is no longer shared by the broader community.
2. The “Rage or Frenzy” (or “Delirium or Insanity”) Exception
The “rage or frenzy”/“delirium or insanity” exception presents a similar
problem in terms of messaging. As an initial matter, “insanity” is a legal
concept, not a medical one. 302 The terms “rage” and “frenzy” have even less
medical significance. But not only are the terms unhelpful in helping juries
understand the relevant concepts, 303 they are actually harmful in terms of
promoting misunderstandings and negative stereotypes.
The use of the term “frenzy”—with its medieval origins 304—conjures
images of snake pit mental hospitals with frightening and dangerous patients.
In order to avoid the strictures of the general suicide rule, family members
bringing a wrongful death action are forced to argue that a loved one was
acting in a rage or frenzy or was insane at the time of the suicide. The reality
is that the most common description of the mental state of those who have
attempted suicide is that they did not want to die; they just wanted the pain
they were experiencing to stop, 305 a seemingly rational decision to a person
who otherwise sees no realistic end to the pain he or she is suffering.
Moreover, continued use of the term “irresistible impulse” rightly or wrongly
often suggests to courts the idea that the decedent simply “snapped” or was
unable to control his actions. 306 In fact, modern psychiatric understanding of

300 Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (citing OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881)).
301 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1324 (2017); see also Eric
T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 503 (“Tort law has long had close ties to
community values and standards and to shifting concepts of public morality.”).
302 See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 185–86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) (“The word
‘insanity’ has no definite legal meaning.”); Pamela A. Wilkins, Competency for Execution: The
Implications of a Communicative Model of Retribution, 76 TENN. L. REV. 713, 722 (2009) (noting that
“insanity is a legal rather than a medical concept”).
303 See generally Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434, 445 (D.S.C. 2016)
(questioning whether the term “insanity” is “meaningful or appropriate” in the context of a suicide case).
304 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
305 See Chandler, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency of courts to view
premeditation as evidence that the act of suicide was not the result of an irresistible impulse).
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suicide suggests that the decision to take one’s life often occurs over an
extended period of time. 307
In short, the continued use of the “rage or frenzy” terminology furthers
stigmatization and misunderstandings associated with suicide, mental
illness, and depression. 308 This is especially troubling at a time when there is
increasing acceptance of the idea that suicide is a public health problem that
needs to be addressed through increased research and prevention.309
IV. TOWARD A COHERENT APPROACH TO SUICIDE CASES
Most of the special causation rules regarding suicide in tort law are
outdated and problematic in their application. It is time for courts to
reevaluate these rules in light of changing conditions. Drawing upon several
fairly recent decisions in the area, the following Part of the Article proposes
alternative rules in the negligence and intentional tort contexts. These
alternative approaches seek to give effect to standard foreseeability and
scope-of-risk analyses and reflect modern understandings of suicide,
including its public dimensions, while also recognizing the special and
sometimes unpredictable nature of suicide.
A. Negligence
In the negligence context, courts need to abolish the blanket rule that
suicide is a superseding cause. Courts also need to eliminate the unhelpful
and harmful rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception altogether. But
courts can continue to recognize the exceptional and usually unforeseeable
nature of suicide in other ways.
1.

Establishing a Default Position and Recognizing
Special Circumstances
While most courts continue to apply the general rule that suicide acts as
an unforeseeable superseding cause, some courts are beginning to move
beyond rote application of the suicide rule and its exceptions and toward a
more traditional scope-of-risk analysis. 310 Implicit in these decisions is the
307 See Schwartz, supra note 161, at 234 (explaining that the tendency of courts to confine “the
definition of uncontrollable impulse to a sudden frenzied act . . . does not comport with modern medical
knowledge of mental illness” (footnote omitted)).
308 Similar concerns over stigma and stereotypes exist regarding the M’Naghten rule in criminal law.
See Scott E. Sundby, The Virtues of a Procedural View of Innocence—A Response to Professor Schwartz,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 168 (1989) (noting the stigma attached to a finding of insanity under M’Naghten).
309 See Carey, supra note 16 (discussing suicide in terms of a public health issue).
310 See Halko v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[T]he
most recent trend is to place less emphasis on the mental state and more on the causal connection.”); see
also Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 575 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming trial court’s denial of
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recognition that traditional foreseeable scope-of-risk analysis is sufficient to
address the vast majority of these cases without relying upon the fiction that
suicide is a superseding cause as a matter of law. For example, where a driver
negligently rear-ends another driver, resulting in physical injuries that
eventually allegedly lead to suicide, suicide is simply not the kind of harm
the defendant foreseeably risked through her negligence. 311 We do not need
a special “suicide rule,” with all of its attendant shortcomings, to tell us this.
But also implicit in the decisions that are willing to actually take the
proximate cause element seriously in suicide cases is the reality that
sometimes suicide is a foreseeable consequence of a defendant’s negligence.
A 2016 opinion by a federal court in South Carolina provides a useful way
of viewing the issue. After reviewing the decisional law in South Carolina
on the subject of causation in negligence cases involving suicide, the court
observed that the cases are “most sensibly read to provide that, under normal
circumstances, a decedent’s suicide will constitute an intervening event
which defeats any showing of causation.” 312 The general rule “may establish
a default position,” but it “cannot be applied in every case.” 313 In short,
mechanical application of the suicide rule should not short-circuit proximate
cause analysis; “[e]ach case must be decided largely on the special facts
belonging to it.” 314
Courts must be willing to look past the boilerplate of the traditional
suicide rule and be willing to recognize the special facts that may be present
that make suicide the kind of harm that the defendant foreseeably risked
through his negligence. Here, the law concerning the theory of negligent
infliction of emotional distress provides a useful parallel.
Courts have long been leery of claims of negligently inflicted emotional
distress. 315 While part of the concern involves the potential for fakery, courts
motion for judgment as a matter of law where decedent had recently attempted suicide on two previous
occasions); Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269–70, 1272–73 (Conn. 1997) (affirming jury verdict
for plaintiff and rejecting application of suicide rule); Wozniak v. Lipoff, 750 P.2d 971, 983 (Kan. 1988)
(affirming jury verdict for plaintiff based on conclusion that being treated for depression made suicide
foreseeable); Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 76–77 (N.D. 1994) (“If the patient’s act of
suicide is a foreseeable result of the medical provider’s breach of duty to treat the patient, the patient’s
act of suicide cannot be deemed a superseding cause of the patient’s death that breaks the chain of
causation between the medical provider and the patient, which absolves the medical provider of
liability.”).
311 See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 414 P.2d 179, 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
312 Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 434, 442 (D.S.C. 2016) (emphasis added).
313 Id.
314 Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 48 S.E.2d 324, 328 (S.C. 1948) (quoted in Wickersham,
194 F. Supp. 3d at 441).
315 See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L.
REV. 789, 807–08 (2007) (noting courts’ concerns with recognizing such claims).
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have also expressed a concern that has helped drive the recognition of the
suicide rule: the fear of expansive liability. 316 Originally, courts refused to
permit recovery for emotional distress unless the defendant’s negligence
resulted in physical impact, there was some type of physical manifestation
of the distress, or the plaintiff was in the “zone of danger” of physical
injury. 317 Several courts eventually observed that “modern advances made in
medical and psychiatric science” helped alleviate the concerns underlying
these special rules. 318 Over time, courts began to move away from these
unrealistic and mechanical rules that foreclosed any real analysis into
foreseeability 319 and began to recognize exceptions permitting recovery
where the facts presented a greater guaranty that the alleged distress was
likely to be real and that the distress was actually within the foreseeable
scope of risk created by the defendant’s negligence. 320 These included

316 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, § 54, at 360–61 (5th ed. 1984) (identifying “the danger that
claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined; and . . . the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy
and disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for
consequences which appear remote from the ‘wrongful’ act” as among the concerns driving courts).
317 See Kircher, supra note 315, at 810–16 (discussing various tests).
318 Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1983); see also Norboe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
66 Conn. L. Rptr. 112, 126 n.19 (Super. Ct. 2018) (“As medical knowledge advances, the clean distinction
between a person’s mental and physical condition becomes increasingly blurred.”); James v. Lieb,
375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985) (“While physical manifestation of the psychological injury may be
highly persuasive, such proof is not necessary given the current state of medical science and advances in
psychology.”); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443 (Wis. 1994) (“[G]iven the
present state of medical science, emotional distress can be established by means other than proof of
physical manifestation.”).
319 See, e.g., Knaub v. Gotwalt, 220 A.2d 646, 649 (Pa. 1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (“The rule
that there must be the mechanical requirement of impact, before recovery will be permitted, charges with
lowered head against the stone wall of the most elementary phenomena observable practically every
day.”).
320 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47
reporters’ notes cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012). Even among jurisdictions that retain impact as a
requirement, exceptions are sometimes recognized when the circumstances involved provide a reasonable
basis for concluding the plaintiff suffered serious emotional harm. State Dep’t of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So.
2d 201, 202–03 (Fla. 2007) (recognizing exception to impact requirement given the foreseeability that
emotional distress would result from the failure to ensure the confidentiality of HIV test results); Moresi
v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990) (recognizing an exception to the
physical manifestation requirement where there is “the especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental
distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not
spurious”); Ricottilli v. Summersville Mem’l Hosp., 425 S.E.2d 629, 635 (W. Va. 1992) (“[A]n individual
may recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress [absent accompanying physical injury] upon
a showing of facts sufficient to guarantee that the emotional damage claim is not spurious.”). Some courts
went beyond this and decided to apply general negligence principles to such claims, while adopting the
requirement that the resulting emotional distress be severe. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520–
21 (Haw. 1970); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996).
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situations in which the claimed distress resulted from negligent handling of
a corpse 321 or negligent notification of the death of a loved one. 322
Over time, courts identified other factual scenarios where a defendant
might foreseeably risk serious emotional distress. 323 Eventually, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts adopted a rule recognizing liability where the
serious emotional harm resulted from conduct that “occurs in the course of
specified categories of activities, undertakings, or relationships in which
negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.” 324
Examples of such categories include
[where] a physician negligently diagnoses a patient with a dreaded or serious
disease; a physician negligently causes the loss of a fetus; a hospital loses a
newborn infant; a person injures a fetus; a hospital (or another) exposes a patient
to HIV infection; an employer mistreats an employee; or a spouse mentally
abuses the other spouse. 325

The examples included in the Restatement are situations in which the
circumstances are special enough to allow a jury to conclude that serious
emotional harm was not only genuine but within the foreseeable scope of
risk created by the defendant’s negligence. 326
A similar principle should guide the analysis in cases involving
negligence leading to suicide. Ordinarily, suicide will be outside the
foreseeable scope of the defendant’s negligence. But where a plaintiff is able
to introduce evidence that the facts of their situation are such that negligent
conduct is especially likely to result in suicide, the default rule regarding
suicide and proximate cause should give way.
For example, in Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Group, LLP, a 2011
case from Missouri, a doctor was accused of negligence resulting in the
suicide of the decedent. 327 The complaint alleged that the doctor’s negligence
while performing spinal surgery resulted in paralysis from the waist down. 328
The resulting pain experienced by the decedent was so severe that the touch
of a sheet across his legs caused him pain. 329 The decedent had a morphine
321

See Ricottilli, 425 S.E.2d at 635 (discussing this exception).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt.
b (listing this example).
323 Id. § 47 cmt. f.
324 Id. § 47(b).
325 Id. § 47 cmt. f.
326 A comment emphasizes, however, that the test is not solely one of foreseeability. As an example,
the comment notes that it might be foreseeable that a doctor who negligently misdiagnoses a celebrity as
having a fatal disease would cause emotional distress to fans of the celebrity. Id. § 47 cmt. i.
327 331 S.W.3d 299 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
328 Id. at 303.
329 Id.
322
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pump installed to ease his pain, but this proved unsuccessful. 330 Eventually,
the decedent ended his own life. 331
After the defendant prevailed on his motion for summary judgment in
the lower court, the Missouri Supreme Court focused on the special causation
rule applied in suicide cases in other jurisdictions and noted that “[m]odern
psychiatry supports the idea that suicide sometimes is a foreseeable result of
traumatic injuries.” 332 In the case of those with spinal cord injuries in
particular, research indicated that individuals with spinal cord injuries are at
a higher risk of suicide and that those with the form of paralysis that the
decedent had were at a greater risk of suicide than other categories of
individuals with paralysis. 333 Other studies have similarly found those with
spinal cord injuries to be at an increased risk of depression and suicide, 334
and much of the popular literature surrounding spinal cord injuries also
references these concepts.335 In short, suicide does not have the same
lightning-strike quality among those with spinal cord injuries as it does
among the general population. As such, a spinal surgeon foreseeably risks
not only emotional distress as a result of a negligent procedure but arguably
suicide resulting from that distress. 336
Other courts have taken a similar approach without explicitly labeling
it as such. For example, in White v. Lawrence, a doctor had treated a patient
330

Id.
Id.
332 Id. at 308.
333 See Susan W. Charlifue & Kenneth A. Gerhart, Behavioral and Demographic Predictors of
Suicide After Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury, 72 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 488, 488
(1991) (finding that “death from suicide is two to six times more prevalent than in the general population”
and finding that of 489 deaths of those studied with spinal cord injuries, 9% were due to suicide) (cited
in Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 308 n.12); Andreas Hartkopp et al., Suicide in a Spinal Cord Injured
Population: Its Relation to Functional Status, 79 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 1356,
1356 (1998) (finding that the suicide rate among those with spinal cord injuries “was nearly five times
higher than expected in the general population” and “that the suicide rate in the group of marginally
disabled persons was nearly twice as high as the group of functionally complete tetraplegic individuals”)
(cited in Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 308 n.12).
334 See M. J. DeVivo et al., Suicide Following Spinal Cord Injury, 29 PARAPLEGIA 620, 624–25
(1991) (citing studies showing higher than expected suicide rates among those with spinal cord injuries);
Zahra Khazaeipour et al., Depression Following Spinal Cord Injury: Its Relationship to Demographic
and Socioeconomic Indicators, 21 TOPICS SPINAL CORD INJ. REHABILITATION 149, 149 (2015)
(classifying depression as being highly prevalent among those with spinal cord injuries).
335 Tiffiny Carlson, Suicide and SCI: Moving Past the Darkness, SPINALCORD.COM (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.spinalcord.com/blog/suicide-and-sci-moving-past-the-darkness [https://perma.cc/YG4MKGK4] (“While a few people with paralysis claim to have never considered it, most people who’ve had
a spinal cord injury, if they’re being honest with themselves, have.”); Depression and Spinal Cord Injury
(SCI), ST. LUKE’S, https://www.saintlukeskc.org/health-library/depression-and-spinal-cord-injury-sci
[https://perma.cc/HZP8-M5UB] (“People with SCI have a higher rate of depression.”).
336 See Kivland, 331 S.W.3d at 313–14 (concluding that summary judgment in favor of surgeon in a
wrongful death action was inappropriate where spinal surgery patient died of suicide following surgery).
331
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with a host of physical ailments. 337 The doctor was aware that the patient was
also an alcoholic who suffered from severe depression to the point that the
doctor viewed the patient as a “‘likely candidate’ for suicide.” 338 The doctor,
unbeknownst to the patient, prescribed medication in an attempt to curb the
patient’s drinking and encouraged the patient’s wife to administer the
medication covertly. 339 The medication made the patient physically sick to
the point that he went to the emergency room for treatment. 340 After being
released, the patient took his own life. 341
Under the majority approach, the defendant’s suicide would, of course,
have been treated as a superseding cause that cut off the doctor’s liability.
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that a jury question
existed on the issue of proximate cause:
The record shows that leading risk factors for suicide include physical illness
and depression. The decedent suffered from both. The plaintiff presented
medical proof that the decedent’s suicide was reasonably foreseeable from a
medical standpoint . . . . Both Dr. Pate and Dr. Smith testified that the defendant
should have reasonably foreseen that secretly prescribing Antabuse to an
alcoholic and depressed patient would cause severe physical problems and
could cause the decedent to choose to end his life. The jury could thus find that
the suicide was the foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence. 342

The White court’s approach is quite similar to the one advanced in this
Article. The court cited a string of decisions that all held that the decedent’s
suicide broke the chain of causation. 343 One of the cases went so far as to
hold:
[W]here a defendant injures another either willfully or negligently and as a
result of the injury, the injured person commits suicide the act of suicide is, as
a matter of law, an intervening independent cause if the decedent knew and
understood the nature of his or her act or the act resulted from a moderately
intelligent power of choice. 344

But the White court was willing to treat this precedent as establishing more
of a default rule and conclude, based upon the constellation of special
circumstances present and the expert testimony presented, that a jury
question existed as to proximate cause.
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344

975 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tenn. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 527–28.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Weathers v. Pilkinton, 754 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added).
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What should qualify as the type of evidence necessary to create a jury
question in this context is incapable of precise definition. In the context of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, some courts have dispensed with
most of the special requirements associated with such claims and instead
have adopted a standard negligence approach. 345 However, these courts also
sometimes require that the plaintiff prove the existence of severe emotional
distress through expert scientific or medical testimony. 346
This same type of evidence may often be necessary in wrongful death
cases involving suicide to establish not only that the defendant’s negligence
was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s suicide but that the pain caused by the
defendant’s negligence made suicide a foreseeable result.347 Science has not
progressed to the point where it can predict with certainty whether one
person versus another will commit suicide. But the scientific research and
understanding of suicide has progressed to where experts can sometimes
testify authoritatively that the circumstances were such that a particular
plaintiff was at a statistically greater risk of suicide than the average person
to the point that suicide was foreseeable.348 Expert testimony may also be
particularly relevant in some instances, such as in the case of teen suicide
where neuroscience has provided valuable insight into how the adolescent
brain develops. 349
In at least some instances, however, the application of common sense
may be sufficient. So, for example, the fact that an individual suffers from
depression should not, absent other circumstances, be enough to raise an

345 Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 446
(Tenn. 1996).
346 See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766–67 (Haw. 1974); Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446
(concluding that “claimed injury or impairment must be supported by expert medical or scientific proof”).
347 See generally Leong, 520 P.2d at 767 (“While a psychiatrist may not be able to establish a
negligent act as the sole cause of plaintiff’s neurosis, he can give a fairly accurate estimate of the probable
effects the act will have upon the plaintiff and whether the trauma induced was a precipitating cause of
neurosis, and whether the resulting neurosis is beyond a level of pain with which a reasonable man may
be expected to cope.”).
348 See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text (discussing studies finding increased risk of
suicide in some cases).
349 See Andrea MacIver, Suicide Causation Experts in Teen Wrongful Death Claims: Will They Assist
the Trier of Fact?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 51, 68–75 (2011) (discussing advancements in neuroscience
with respect to the adolescent brain and the value of expert testimony on this issue).
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issue regarding proximate cause. 350 But the fact that a defendant is aware that
the decedent had recently attempted suicide may be. 351
The approach described here may also be employed in cases where the
alleged negligence involves the failure to prevent suicide. Patton v. Bickford
is a 2016 case from Kentucky in which an eighth grader committed suicide,
allegedly as a result of bullying. 352 The decedent’s estate filed negligence
actions against various teachers and administrators who allegedly knew or
should have known that the child was being bullied but failed to take
reasonable steps to stop it. 353 The lower court granted summary judgment to
the teachers on the predictable grounds that the child’s suicide was a
superseding cause that relieved the defendants of liability. 354 On appeal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court applied standard scope-of-risk analysis while also
taking into account the public dimensions of suicide. The court noted “that
bullying as a source of torment has been recognized as a foreseeable cause
of suicide and medical/psychological professionals now widely
acknowledge this societal concern.” 355 Interestingly, in support of its
conclusion, the court referenced the fact that the Kentucky Board of
Education’s website contained a letter to teachers noting that “student
suicides resulting from the bullying and harassment activities of other youths
have escalated” in recent years. 356 Thus, the Board of Education itself viewed
suicide as a foreseeable result of the failure to prevent bullying.
Patton is also noteworthy for its recognition of the role tort law can play
in addressing the public health problem that is suicide. In its decision, the
court also referenced recent “bullying bills” enacted in Kentucky that
“mandate[d] that school teachers be trained in suicide prevention policies.” 357
This fact served not only as evidence as to the foreseeability of suicide in the
case of bullying but also as evidence of a “public policy decision to stop
bullying in schools.” 358 The court was thus able to tie the legislation to the
policy-driven nature of the proximate cause requirement and the traditional
350 See Rafferman v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding that defendant could not have reasonably foreseen decedent’s suicide despite the awareness
that decedent had “become ‘visibly and obviously depressed’”).
351 Cf. Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 575 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We can think of no other
facts that would have given school officials more reason to anticipate Shawn’s suicide than Shawn’s two
recent, overt suicide attempts.”).
352 529 S.W.3d 717 (Ky. 2016).
353 Id. at 721.
354 Id. at 722.
355 Id. at 733.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 Id.
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role tort law has played in deterring “harmful socially unacceptable behavior
by imposing liability upon the wrongdoer for the wrong done.” 359
The Patton decision is also noteworthy for what it does not do. One
possible objection to the approach this Article proposes is that it will lead to
increased liability. Perhaps. But in addition to raising a jury question as to
proximate cause, a plaintiff must also ultimately prove that the defendant’s
actions were a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s suicide. In Patton, the plaintiff
was unable to meet this burden. 360 Without an obvious causal link or expert
testimony regarding whether the bullying actually caused the suicide, the
plaintiff was unable to survive summary judgment on the issue of
causation. 361 Thus, Patton serves as a reminder of the difficult road that those
seeking to recover under a negligence theory face, even without application
of the suicide rule.
2. Abolishing the Rage or Frenzy/Delirium or Insanity Exception
Courts should also abolish the rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity
exception to the standard suicide rule. The exception is a relic from a time
when suicide was not well understood, when societal attitudes on the subject
were quite different, and when suicide remained a crime. The exception has
always primarily reflected a view of fault or lack thereof on the part of a
decedent. Now that nearly every state has adopted a system of comparative
fault, decisions as to the fault of the decedent are better dealt with as part of
this analysis. Indeed, it is noteworthy that while the Restatement (Third) of
Torts references some of the decisions involving suicide and proximate
cause, the rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception does not appear in
the third Restatement. 362
There are other reasons to abolish the exception. The law can play a
role as a part of a multidisciplinary approach to the public health problem of
suicide. 363 At a minimum, it should not further misunderstandings that
359

Id. at 733–34.
Id. at 736.
361 Id.
362 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (referencing suicide cases
and proximate cause but omitting any reference to this exception).
363 See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Suicide Prevention: A Public Health
Issue, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/asap_suicide_issue2-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9D6Q4UF] (discussing the role of multidisciplinary perspectives in public health); SUICIDE PREVENTION RES.
CTR., Suicide Prevention and Policy Legislation, https://www.sprc.org/sites/default/files/resourceprogram/FromthefieldLegislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/L55P-CUFM] (discussing state laws aimed at
suicide prevention). Tort law has sometimes been used as a means of addressing public health issues. See
Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J. L.
MED. ETHICS 224, 225 (2002) (“In recent years, the most ardent proponents of litigation as public policy
have been public health advocates.”); W. E. Parmet & R. A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation,
21 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 437, 437 (2000) (“Increasingly, individuals and organizations concerned
360
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prevent progress. The sense of shame and stigma that often accompanies
depression and related conditions tends to discourage those who are
considering suicide from seeking help. 364 Aside from crafting legal rules that
are consistent with the goal of reducing the number of suicides, courts can
shape the law in ways that do not perpetuate the sorts of stereotypes that
discourage those with depression or thoughts of suicide from seeking
treatment. By eliminating the unhelpful and antiquated rage or
frenzy/delirium or insanity exception, courts can shape the law regarding
suicide and tort law in a manner that better reflects more modern
understandings of suicide and its prevention.
3. Comparative Fault
Given the fact that most suicides will still remain outside of the scope
of risk created by a defendant’s negligence under the proposed approach, the
concerns over expanded liability should be limited. Any remaining concerns
are largely addressed through application of standard comparative fault
principles. 365 By permitting juries to take the decedent’s own actions into
account when comparing the relative responsibilities of the parties, courts
can better respect a jurisdiction’s determinations as to the operation of

about public health have sought to use litigation to further their goals. In other words, courts are now
being used affirmatively in an effort to make public health policy.”); Stephen P. Teret & Michael Jacobs,
Prevention and Torts: The Role of Litigation in Injury Control, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 17, 19–20
(1989) (discussing the role that litigation plays in preventing injuries from dangerous products).
364 See Mark E. Hastings et al., Shame, Guilt, and Suicide, in SUICIDE SCIENCE 76–77 (Thomas
Joiner & M. David Rudd eds., 2002) (“Theory and emerging empirical research indicates that feelings of
shame are more prominent than guilt in the dynamics leading up to suicidal thoughts and behaviors.”);
Kimberly Arditte Hall, Interpersonal Risk for Suicide in Social Anxiety: The Roles of Shame and
Depression, 239 PSYCHIATRY RES. 139, 139 (2016) (analyzing how shame and depression may help to
explain the relationship between social anxiety and interpersonal suicide risk factors); Maanvi Singh,
Study: Vast Majority of People Who Are Depressed Do Not Seek Help, NPR (Dec. 2, 2016, 2:08 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/12/02/504131307/study-vast-majority-of-people-whoare-depressed-do-not-seek-help [https://perma.cc/7ZYA-5XQE] (noting that the stigma associated with
depression discourages people from seeking help); Alice G. Walton, Why Are So Many People with
Depression Not Getting Treatment?, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 10:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alicegwalton/2018/02/09/why-are-so-many-people-with-depression-not-getting-treated/#23b810a1b2fb
[https://perma.cc/BKF2-2A22] (suggesting that one reason why people diagnosed with depression do not
seek treatment is because of the stigma associated with depression).
365 Currently, there are few cases fitting this fact pattern in which the decedent’s fault is considered
for purposes of comparative fault analysis. See Allison C. v. Advanced Educ. Servs., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d
605, 611 (Ct. App. 2005) (involving jury verdict apportioning 2% of fault to teen with psychiatric issues
who killed himself); Rubin v. Aaron, 594 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 1993) (involving jury verdict
apportioning 80% of responsibility to negligent defendant). This is undoubtedly because the suicide rule
effectively dispenses with the majority of claims involving this set of facts.
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comparative fault principles while also better reflecting modern views
regarding suicide. 366
Where a defendant’s negligence is alleged to have affirmatively
contributed to the decedent’s suicide, a jury should be permitted to consider
the decedent’s own actions when comparing the respective responsibilities
of the parties. The fact that the decedent’s own actions were the most direct
cause of death might increase the decedent’s share of responsibility. 367 In
apportioning responsibility, many courts take the position that the plaintiff’s
contributory negligence must be evaluated by using a subjective standard
that takes into account the plaintiff’s own mental state, including any mental
impairments. 368 The fact that the decedent had an existing psychiatric
disability at the time of the suicide may reduce, but not completely eliminate,
the decedent’s portion of responsibility. Thus, a plaintiff is not forced to
advocate for the all-or-nothing form of responsibility mandated by the rage
or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception to the suicide rule, nor is a court
forced to apply it. Where, however, the decedent’s psychiatric disability truly
prevented the decedent from understanding the physical nature and
consequences of his actions, 369 the decedent would no longer be at fault at
all, and comparative negligence principles would not reduce recovery. 370
In cases where the defendant owes a duty to take reasonable measures
to prevent suicide, the suicide rule has not served as the same sort of
limitation on a plaintiff’s ability to recover as it has in other cases. Therefore,
the issue of comparative fault has come up more frequently. The general rule
that has emerged is that where the decedent was in the custody of the
defendant—for example, where the decedent was a prisoner or where the
decedent was a patient confined to a hospital under a suicide watch—the

366 See generally Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 832–36 (Tex. 2013) (citing Texas’s
proportionate responsibility in support of refusal to apply the “unlawful acts” doctrine to bar recovery
where decedent died after ingesting heroin).
367 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(listing “the strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the harm”
as a relevant consideration in apportioning responsibility).
368 See Dodson v. State Dep’t. of Human Servs., 703 N.W.2d 353, 357–59 (S.D. 2005) (discussing
majority rule of applying the subjective standard); Gray v. Roten, No. W2010-00614-COA-R3-CV,
2011 WL 236115, at *10 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing cases that use the subjective
standard).
369 See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text (discussing this prong of the exception).
370 See Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Iowa 2011) (“Whether a person
suffering from a mental disease lacks the capacity to be found negligent is generally a question of fact.”);
Dodson, 703 N.W.2d at 357 (“One whose mental faculties are diminished, not amounting to total insanity,
is capable of contributory negligence, but is not held to the objective reasonable-person standard.”
(quoting 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 864 (2005))).

822

113:767 (2019)

Abolishing the Suicide Rule

decedent’s own actions do not reduce recovery. 371 In the noncustodial setting,
however, normal comparative fault principles typically apply and the
decedent’s own actions may reduce recovery. 372
B. Intentional Torts
In the case of an intentional tort resulting in suicide, the current majority
approach, which requires that the defendant’s conduct be a substantial factor
in causing the suicide in order for the defendant to be held liable, 373 already
strikes the appropriate balance. Introducing the issue of foreseeability into
intentional tort analysis is inconsistent with the principles underlying tort law
and is only likely to lead to confusion. And introducing the suicide rule and
its exceptions into this area is inadvisable for the reasons discussed
previously.
Regardless of the precise formulation of the test, 374 the majority
approach gives effect to the basic tort principle that a defendant who engages
in intentional wrongdoing is more culpable than one who is merely negligent,
and should thus not be able to claim the unforeseeability of a negative
consequence as an excuse for avoiding liability. 375 At the same time, by
requiring that the defendant’s conduct be more than a trivial cause of the
resulting suicide 376 and by requiring that causation usually be established
through expert testimony, 377 courts can effectively check the possibility of
strict liability. Moreover, the nature of most claims will serve as an inherent
limitation on the scope of liability. The vast majority of the decisions in the
area involve the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting
in suicide. 378 The requirement of this claim that the defendant’s conduct be
extreme and outrageous already serves to limit the number of instances in
371 See Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 18–19 (Ind. 1998); see also Cole v. Multnomah
Cty., 592 P.2d 221, 223 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); c.f. P.W. v. Children’s Hosp., 364 P.3d 891, 894–95, 898
(Colo. 2016) (holding that hospital was liable for a patient’s damages resultant from his failed suicide
attempt because “the hospital [knew he was] actively suicidal, and . . . the admission [was] for the purpose
of preventing [his] self-destructive behavior”); Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 161, 167 (N.J. 1988)
(holding that a hospital’s staff members were liable for damages resulting from a patient’s failed suicide
attempt because they “were aware of her condition, [and] their duty was to prevent [her] self-damaging
actions”).
372 See Mulhern, 799 N.W.2d at 115–16; Maunz v. Perales, 76 P.3d 1027, 1033–34 (Kan. 2003).
373 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
374 See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying text (discussing variations).
375 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
376 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 36
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“When an actor’s negligent conduct constitutes only a trivial contribution to a
causal set that is a factual cause of harm [in the case of multiple sufficient causes], the harm is not within
the scope of the actor’s liability.”).
377 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
378 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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which defendants may be held liable. 379 Assuming courts do not lower the
bar on this element of an IIED claim, the number of potential claims should
be fairly limited without having to resort to other, more awkward causation
standards.
CONCLUSION
The standard suicide rule that applies in negligence and some
intentional tort cases is based on outdated science and a debatable appraisal
of society’s views concerning the morality of suicide. The same is true of its
rage or frenzy/delirium or insanity exception. The former rule tends to shortcircuit commonsense inquiry into causation while the latter tends to further
harmful stereotypes. At a time when suicide is increasingly recognized as a
serious public health issue, courts do a disservice to those impacted by
suicide by continuing to apply these rules. While the special and often
unpredictable nature of suicide needs to be taken into account in wrongful
death actions, tort law already has the tools in place to effectively deal with
such cases. Courts need only begin using them.

379
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See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.

